Scapegoated, castaway, and forgotten: the dispensable principals of school turnaround by Buckrham, Robin Neal & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
BUCKRHAM, ROBIN NEAL, Ed.D. Scapegoated, Castaway, and Forgotten: The 
Dispensable Principals of School Turnaround. (2016) 
Directed by Drs. Ulrich “Rick” Reitzug and Kathleen Casey. 142 pp. 
 
 
The blaring din of rhetoric surrounding school reform has become so loud that we 
rarely hear the sound of the school principal actually engrossed in the daily work of 
improving schools across the country.  The purpose of this dissertation is to give voice to 
those principals in North Carolina schools who have been replaced as a result of this 
battle over how schools can be improved.  Rather than focus on the muddled voices of 
politicians debating this topic, I have chosen to do as Casey (1993) does and present the 
untold stories of those on the front lines of this war on school reform in hopes of 
“. . . recreating the possibility of public debate which has actually been suppressed by 
national reports” (p. 3).  As a result of the No Child Left Behind legislation, the school 
turnaround reform model, as outlined in the School Improvement Grant (SIG) guidelines, 
has become the model for improving student achievement across the country (GAO, 
2011, p. 3).  I focus the spotlight on principals who have been replaced due to federal, 
state, or local district efforts to improve failing schools. 
In Chapter I, I briefly provide the backdrop for the school improvement 
movement and explain my reasons for conducting this research along with the 
significance of this study to the body of work on educational leadership in low 
performing schools.  This chapter includes my research questions along with a 
description of the theoretical framework used for this study.  Included in this chapter is 
the definition of terms that may be unfamiliar to readers.  Chapter II is a review of the 
literature on school turnaround that provides insight into SIG sanctions that led to the 
termination of many principals.  These sanctions have served as a model for state and 
district turnaround efforts as well.  Included in this same chapter is research on the 
effectiveness of the turnaround model and the practice of replacing principals for 
purportedly better ones.  Chapter III focuses on the methodology used to conduct the 
study while Chapter IV includes the stories of the castaway principals and my analysis of 
the data collected.  Chapter V represents my conclusions after analyzing the interview 
data along with suggestions for further study.  I further explore the impact these practices 
have on the school leadership position, and implications for future policy at the district, 
state, and federal levels in this area. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE MAKING OF THE PRINCIPAL 
  
Prior to the creation of the school principal position, teachers worked mainly 
without supervision in one-room school buildings handling instruction and the 
management of the entire school with little interference from the local school board. 
 
At the turn of the 19th century, as educational reformers built up the bureaucratic 
framework of the state and local public school system, they realigned the primary 
attention of the principal from the classroom to the central administrative 
structure.  This professionalization process involved proscribing lines of authority 
and accountability, establishing entry requirements and academic training, and 
improving compensation for the work. (Rousmaniere, 2013, p. 5) 
 
Since this time, the role of principal has been represented metaphorically in efforts to 
describe the over-arching and ever changing responsibilities of a school leader.  Beck and 
Murphy (1993), basing their themes on evidence found in educational literature from 
each decade since 1920, synthesized their research with the following list of dominant 
principal metaphors by decade: 
 
x 1920s—Values Broker 
x 1930s—Scientific Manager 
x 1940s—Democratic Leader 
x 1950s—Theory Guided-Administrator 
x 1960s—Bureaucratic Executive 
x 1970s—Humanistic Facilitator 
x 1980s—Instructional Leader. (p. xi) 
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Other research by Senge (1994) suggests that the 1990s metaphor for a school principal 
would be that of learning organization catalyst.  I would add to this list a 21st century 
metaphor of the principal as Change Agent or Turnaround Specialist as it relates to the 
challenges they now face in improving achievement for students in some of the most 
challenging schools in the nation.  At first glance these metaphors seem complex as much 
as they are contradictory, further emphasizing the myriad of responsibilities and 
expectations of school principals over time.  These and other metaphors continue to 
evolve, implying that the evolving nature of the principalship sometimes makes the 
definition of success in the role a moving target. 
Purpose and Significance of the Study 
 I have been an educational leader for 18 years.  Seven of those years were spent 
as a high school English teacher (yes, I consider teachers leaders), three of them as an 
assistant principal in a Title I elementary school, and I am in year nine as a principal of a 
K-8, Title I charter school.  What I have found in every role is that the responsibility for 
the success or failure of students and, ultimately the school, rests squarely on the 
shoulders of the principal.  Despite what other factors may be contributing to the work 
that she or he must perform, there is little to no margin for error.  The long hours, the 
sacrifices, the coaching, and the stress that accompany the job can go unnoticed and 
unappreciated and at the same time they can bring you recognition and promotion.  It is a 
delicate balancing act that most feel on a daily basis.  I will present a backdrop of 
education policy in the state of North Carolina, and in the nation, to provide a greater 
understanding of the metamorphosis of school reform over the years.  Specifically, it will 
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present a brief history of school reform in America, examine NCLB sanctions and the 
Turnaround option and its success, and identify the prevailing attitudes of supporters and 
opponents of school turnaround as it relates to principal replacement.   
Background 
Beginning in 1997, North Carolina began providing support to schools having 
difficulty in meeting academic performance criteria.  During this time the dreaded 
“Assistance Teams” were assigned to schools considered low performing in an effort to 
revitalize the school by giving support to the teachers and the administration.  In 2006, 
the Turnaround Schools Program placed instructional coaches in turnaround schools.  
The instructional coaches were there to support teachers and the leadership coaches were 
there to assist the administrators.  This took place in 35 schools across the state.  By 
2010, the number of schools designated by the state as low-performing and in need of 
reform was 118.  North Carolina continued down the rabbit hole of school improvement 
by accepting Race to the Top (RttT) grant money in order to provide intense, focused 
intervention for the state’s bottom 5% of schools.  With this increase in funding it 
appeared that school leaders in the state were finally getting the much-needed resources 
to improve their failing schools.  Coupled with these state reform efforts, No Child Left 
Behind legislation, along with SIG funding, put the spotlight on principals in ways that 
could not have been predicted as they now had to work in a limited amount of time to 
erase years of neglect in school districts all over the country. 
Districts across the country have deemed principals ineffective and have replaced 
them with, purportedly, more effective principals in exchange for millions in School 
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Improvement Grant (SIG) funds or supplemental state or district funds.  Little 
consideration is given to the hard work of the replaced principal or the relationship they 
have with the school community.  In addition, as demographic shifts challenge the status 
quo, educators can no longer ignore the demand to create socially just and culturally-
responsive learning environments for students.  Principals in failing schools, especially, 
are forced to confront this challenge because the daunting reality in the field of education 
is that the schools that are low-performing are segregated schools where there is a high 
minority or high poverty population or both.  This is compounded by groups that are 
typically marginalized such as English Language Learners and students with disabilities.  
This practice has created a new dynamic that, I believe, has separated principals into two 
groups.  I call the first group the “saviors.”  They are the benefactors, survivors, and 
ultimately the “heroes and sheroes” of turnaround reform.  The second group I call the 
“castaways.  These are the principals who are casualties of this process.  For the purposes 
of this study I have decided to focus on the group that has been silenced in the midst of 
this movement, the “castaways.” 
My Truth 
When I arrived at my small charter school back in 2006 the school was struggling 
financially, enrollment was dropping, and test scores were mediocre.  I was hired to turn 
the school around.  As an assistant principal, I had served faithfully alongside two female 
principals.  I stepped out of my comfort zone and, being led by my passion for education 
and children along with a social justice consciousness, I set my mind to change this 
school.  After three years, consistent with much of the research on school improvement, 
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the school improved significantly outperforming the local LEA and even the state in 
Math and Science.  Enrollment increased, test scores increased, and we exited school 
improvement status.  We eventually came within six points of being recognized as a 
North Carolina School of Distinction when schools were being recognized in this 
category.  The shame was lifted and we celebrated. 
 During this time, I lost time with my family, suffered a miscarriage due to the 
overwhelming amount of stress during a pregnancy, and terminated a host of teachers 
who were not committed to—or were incapable of—educating poor children or children 
of color.  While I continued working on the work at my school, I heard about principals 
who were losing their jobs because their schools were failing.  I talked daily with friends 
who were exhausted from the work of school improvement.  My “principal-friends” 
listened to me cry and vent when benchmarks were low, or I had to replace a teacher, or a 
teacher quit in the middle of the school year unable to deal with the demands of the job.  I 
judged myself, blamed myself when things went wrong, challenged myself, and finally, 
encouraged myself when no one else would. 
I was alone in most respects, having left the security of a large school district for 
the autonomy and creativity of a charter.  However, the reality was that, prior to my 
arrival, the school was failing.  Having heard the horror stories, initially, I lived daily 
with the reality that I could lose my job.  I was fortunate that the school improved and I 
did not lose my job—but it easily could have turned out otherwise.  Now that the 
Common Core and Essential Standards have replaced the North Carolina Standard 
Course of Study, my school, like so many others, is yet again challenged with coming out 
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of the pit of low performance.  I am reminded once more that I could find myself 
unemployed even with all my training, degrees, experience, and past success, if I am 
unable to facilitate a turnaround in the time set forth by my Board of Directors. 
 This research is important to me because as a school leader I share the anxiety, the 
frustrations, and the fear of so many others who give their lives to serving in low 
performing schools.  We are inextricably connected no matter where we are in the nation.  
As I attend conferences and meet other principals who serve in high needs schools, our 
stories are the same, our fears are common, and our frustrations are shared.   
Although we find refuge in this comradery when we can enjoy these short retreats from 
our buildings, we all know that replacement is always on the table regardless of how hard 
we try.  This reality shakes us all in some way and influences how we lead.  
Some of us allow this reality to compromise our moral compass like those 
administrators in Atlanta, Georgia accused of tampering with standardized tests in order 
to avoid sanctions.  There are others of us who internalize the pressures, like Stephanie, 
one my participants, and become ill.  And there are still others in our position who work 
and toil day and night to see growth in our schools, only to be replaced anyway with little 
to no notice.  Are these scapegoat principals ineffective and no use to the war on low 
performance?  Are those who have never served in a high-needs, low-performing school 
more effective, or is it that they are flying under the radar because their students always 
perform well?  What happens to the replaced principals and how does this failure impact 
the future of their careers?  Is the turnaround movement really creating better schools or 
are these principals being sacrificed in vain? 
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 No leader goes into this profession expecting to fail.  They believe they have what 
it takes to help lead successful schools and they do everything in their ability to make 
achievement happen.  At some point their superiors considered them competent enough 
to lead.  Yet, some of them fail while others replace them, seemingly becoming the new 
secret weapon that the district was saving to right all the wrong that these former 
principals caused.  In this study, it is my goal to share the lived experiences and life 
histories of the castaways so that the human side of this profession is heard over the 
blaring accusations of the media and scapegoating of district officials.  Castaways are 
human, not disposable goods.  Their careers are sacred, not headlines for the front page of 
the local paper.  Castaways represent some of the silent victims of the turnaround 
movement and I believe it is time to shed light on their stories. 
Research Questions 
 This study will examine the experiences and impact of termination on principals 
who lose their jobs as a result of turnaround policy.  For this study, I will focus on the 
following five research questions: 
1. What are the stories and experiences of principals and their colleagues who 
were placed in high needs school, and subsequently replaced? 
a.  What kind of special training and support do principals in high needs 
schools receive prior to entering into these environments? 
b.  How does the school district support principals in high needs schools? 
c.  To what extent do principals who are replaced due to federal policies 
possess a social justice orientation? 
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d. How should the experiences of principals removed due to federal or local 
school reform models inform and impact education policy? 
Theoretical Framework 
My study will be grounded in social justice theory.  Social justice is a concept that 
has undergone a variety of definitions as scholars seek to make meaning of the ideals of 
equity and fairness (Goldfarb & Grinberg, 2002; Marshall & Oliva, 2010; Theoharis, 
2007; Tillman, 2002).  Tillman (2002) says, “Generally, social justice theorists and 
activists focus their inquiry on how institutionalized theories, norms, and practices in 
schools and society lead to social, political, economic and educational inequities” (as 
cited in Marshall & Oliva, 2010, p. 20).  Goldfarb and Grinberg (2002) create their 
version of a social justice definition by connecting social justice to the democratic 
process.  My study is informed by the more recent work of George Theoharis (2007) who 
defines principals who lead for social justice as those who “make the issues of race, class, 
gender, disability, sexual orientation, and other historically and currently marginalizing 
conditions in the United States central to their advocacy, leadership practice, and vision” 
(p. 223).   
The research on social justice has grown significantly in the past several years, 
especially in the arena of education where the diversity and complexity of school 
organization and operation have changed tremendously.  Relevant to my study is research 
of Wilkerson (2014), who found that in 2006, “approximately eighty percent (77%) of the 
lowest performing schools in the state of North Carolina were headed by African-
Americans” (p. 4).  This indicates that there are issues of social justice not only operating 
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at the student level, but at the administrative level as well.  It appears that this issue of 
social justice in educational leadership exists in the charter sector as well.  It is not 
uncommon to be one among a room full of African American administrators at North 
Carolina charter school conferences whenever sessions are held that addressed the needs 
of high poverty students  
Social justice theoretical framework is used to guide this study because school 
turnaround is ultimately about disparities and inequities in student achievement within 
failing schools.  As public schools become more racially segregated, there is a trend of 
high minority schools being deemed low performing while majority white schools enjoy 
reputations of excellence.  Policymakers preoccupied with turning around low 
performing schools appear to have missed the redistricting tactics that have created 
“neighborhood schools” and widened the social divide between students of color and 
their white counterparts in our public schools. As Kozol (1991) posits, “the dual society, 
at least in public education, seems to be unquestioned” (p. 4).  As a result, turnaround has 
become more an issue of social justice rather than academic improvement.  To ignore the 
social justice element would do this study a disservice.  The very nature of high needs 
schools requires principals to have a social justice orientation.  At the same time, school 
turnaround is a rapid process that is results driven and social justice strategies are often 
seen as a hindrance to the bottom line—test scores.  As I interview principals and gather 
data about their experiences, the extent to which social justice informed their practice will 
be key to understanding how, if at all, it contributed to their replacement and whether or 
not a key ingredient is being ignored in the school improvement process. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The bodies of literature relevant to my study are: 
x School reform in public schools 
x Business influences in educational reform 
x School turnaround reform 
x Effective principals for high needs schools 
The School Reform Movement 
 As far back as 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” school 
reform has been at the center of the country’s ills.  His authorization of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), placed confidence in state educational agencies 
(SEA’s) to dispense federal funds and monitor compliance with the law’s requirements in 
order to eradicate inequality in public schools.  Through this act, the Title I program was 
established.  Title I provided funding to schools and school districts with a high 
percentage of students from low income families (U.S. Department of Education, 2015a).  
These funds were distributed in addition to state funds granted to schools based on the 
average daily membership or ADM of students.  The rationale offered to justify these 
additional fiscal resources was that children from poverty are more at risk than their 
middle class and wealthy counterparts and therefore needed more money to solve the 
achievement gap.   
11 
 
The condition of public schools in America gained national attention with the 
1983 publishing of A Nation at Risk, written by the National Commission on Excellence 
in Education (NCEE), which declared war on our schools and claimed our country lived 
in the shadows of other countries that were advancing academically and technologically. 
“The collective author of this report was a commission appointed by the U.S. Secretary of 
Education in August 1981 and chaired by David Gardner, the president of the University 
of California” (Westbury, 1984, pp. 431–432).  “The membership of the committee 
contained the obligatory Nobel Laureate, three university presidents (including Yale’s), a 
Harvard professor (the Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics and Professor of the History of 
Science), the retired chairman of the board of Bell Laboratories, and assorted interest 
group representatives, state officials, principals and the Teacher of the Year for 1981-
1982” (Westbury, 1984, p. 432).  Westbury (1984) notes that the varied positions of those 
who serve on these kinds of boards highly influence the findings as this “professionalized 
cadre of bureaucratic advocates of this or that seek to mobilize public opinion and so 
congressional votes, to their particular causes” (p. 434).  The report declared, “The 
educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of 
mediocrity that threatens our very future as a nation and a people.  What was 
unimaginable a generation ago has begun to occur--others are matching and surpassing 
our educational attainments” (Gardner, 1983, p. 5).  Since this time, the American 
educational system has gone through a series of strategies to solve this problem of failing 
schools.  
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 Although there is a caution from the NCEE to avoid the “unproductive tendency 
of some to search for scapegoats among the victims, such as the ‘beleaguered teachers’” 
(Gardner, 1983, p. 9), the majority of the recommendations to improve content, time, 
teaching, standards and expectations deal with the competency of educators in our 
schools which mirrors the basis for turnaround reform today as principals are being 
blamed for poor student achievement and replaced as a result.  The NCEE (Gardner, 
1983) quotes Ronald Regan’s message to a National Academy of Sciences meeting, 
saying, “This country was built on American respect for education” (p. 13).  However, a 
close look at education in this country will point to the fact that historically, America has 
not respected education for all.  In the 1896 landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Plessy v Ferguson, the federal government upheld racially segregated public facilities 
under the separate but equal law.  It wasn’t until 1954, over half a century later, the same 
courts declared separate but equal laws in public schools unconstitutional in Brown v 
Board of Education.  These years of legislative racism rendered poor and minority 
students educationally dysfunctional and unable to compete in the global marketplace 
referenced in the report.  As education moved on, these groups remained trapped in a 
period of inequity and racism.  While the NCEE fueled our nation’s effort to reform 
schools and offered a rebuke to the government for not supporting education financially, 
they conveniently neglected to take responsibility for the very mediocre, low performing 
schools they helped nurture in Black and urban communities where much of the decline 
in achievement they refer to was, and still is prevalent. 
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 According to Westbury (1984), “‘Reform’ is, of course, one of the key categories 
of American public rhetoric and education has long been one of the foci of ‘reforming’ 
initiatives, particularly in periods of turbulence and unrest” (p. 434).  In the 1990s, states 
like North Carolina were considered pioneers, being one of the first to establish 
standards-based accountability standards in schools through the ABC Accountability 
Model.  In response to poor instructional practices among teachers, the Legislature passed 
Senate Bill 1139 in June 1996.  This reform model used the results from standardized 
tests patterned after the North Carolina Standard Course of Study.  “The planned reward 
and penalty structure of the reform was designed to raise teachers' level of concern about 
the implementation of the reform.  Rewards and penalties were to be awarded to all 
certified staff in schools based on students' performance on end-of-grade multiple-choice 
tests” (Sain, 2000, p. 7). 
 The “ABC’s” as we jokingly used to call them when I was a classroom teacher, 
were hailed as ground-breaking and North Carolina became a model state for school 
reform.  The problem with this model was that it became an incubator for achievement 
gaps because there was no attention given to the subgroups within each school.  Overall 
school proficiency was used to determine which schools “made it” and which schools did 
not.  With no consequences for the failure of poor, minority, English language learners, 
or students with disabilities, North Carolina, like many states, enjoyed a false sense of 
success that gave no regard to the needs of these marginalized groups.  Consequently, 
neither teachers nor administrators felt especially compelled to advocate for these 
subgroups of students as monetary rewards were being awarded to those schools that 
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achieved growth based on this composite calculation.  In fact, Jones (2001) points to a 
negative side effect of this system of rewards that resulted in, “teachers leaving schools 
that failed to meet test-score standards, while promising new teachers asked about the 
bonus and were attracted to schools that earned” (pp. 25-26).  Even at its height, this 
reform effort was largely negligent and did not hold states or school districts accountable 
for leaving certain groups “behind.” 
As the federal government continued to troubleshoot school reform strategies and 
legislation since this dismal prophecy was released, they extended their realm of 
authority into states by passing the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002.  This 
groundbreaking piece of legislation was the game changer in school improvement 
because it limited both state and local control of education, which, prior to this time, had 
remained unchallenged.  Established under President George W. Bush, NCLB “remained 
closely informed by the standards, testing, and accountability reforms advocated by 
Texas’s business community when he served as Governor of Texas” (Rhodes, 2012, p. 
139).  It was later discovered is that Texas’s results in student achievement were highly 
inflated.  Furthermore, according to Tirrozi (2013), “there was no viable body of research 
or any evaluation to support the claims based on which NCLB was “sold” to Congress, 
educators, and the general public” (p. 173).  Therefore, the legislation was seen by some 
to be hypocritical because it was not founded on the scientifically researched-based 
practices that school districts must include in their reform strategies.   
 Even Diane Ravitch (2011), a leading voice in education and former assistant 
secretary and counselor to the secretary in the U.S. Department of Education under the 
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Bush administration, became increasingly disillusioned by NCLB legislation and its 
failure to produce results.  She admits,  
 
I had drunk deeply of the elixir that promised a quick fix to intractable problems.  
I too had jumped aboard a bandwagon, one festooned with banners celebrating the 
power of accountability, incentives, and markets.  I too was captivated by these 
ideas.  They promised to end bureaucracy, to ensure that poor children were not 
neglected, to empower poor parents, to enable poor children to escape failing 
schools, and to close the achievement gap between rich and poor, schools, and 
choice would create opportunities for poor kids to leave for better schools.  All of 
this seemed to make sense, but there was little empirical evidence, just promise 
and hope.  I wanted to share the promise and the hope.  I wanted to believe that 
choice and accountability would produce great results.  But over time, I was 
persuaded by accumulating evidence that the latest reforms were not likely to live 
up to their promise.  The more I saw, the more I lost the faith. (p. 4) 
 
This admission by well-respected educators in the field of how they bought into this high 
stakes system of accountability points not just to our naiveté regarding the punitive nature 
of these sanctions, but also shows how desperate we are to find a solution for low 
performing schools.  The ideas being promulgated by politicians sometimes lure the best 
of us in only to discover that the river was simply a mirage of improvement set in a desert 
of inequity.   
“Since the passage of No Child Left Behind, ‘turnaround’ has become a 
significant focus of school reform efforts in the United States, especially in urban areas” 
(Peck & Reitzug, 2013, p. 3).  The impact of this legislation has reformed not only the 
way we improve schools for inner-city students, but also the expectations and skillsets of 
the principals.  “From states and districts paying for principals to be trained as turnaround 
specialists, to U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan’s call to turn around the 
country’s 5,000 lowest-performing schools, the concept of rapid, large-scale reform in 
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individual schools—not just incremental school improvement—has taken hold” 
(Salmonowicz, 2009, p. 20).  These reform efforts are often very aggressive and take 
their greatest toll on school communities by dismantling staff and replacing principals.  
As these reform strategies become more commonplace in the public education arena it 
behooves educators and policy makers to take an inventory of the effects of the reform in 
order to make prudent decisions about the direction of policy regarding school 
improvement and more specifically, the trend to replace leadership in schools across the 
country.  This review will examine the body of literature on school turnaround reform 
and the effects of these policies on school leaders. 
Corporate Crossover 
 As education borrows from the experiences of others, the business world has had 
the greatest influence on the turnaround movement.  This trend to compare schools to 
businesses and assume that improving a school is the equivalent of turning around a 
factory has received mixed reviews from both educators and experts in business and 
organizational management.  “A large and growing body of empirical literature is now 
available that helps us see how churches, hospitals, universities, government entities, for-
profit firms, and not-for-profit organizations have successfully and unsuccessfully 
engaged in recovery efforts” (Murphy, 2008, p. 75).  Supporters of cross-sector strategies 
such as E. A. Hassel and Hassel (2009) contribute to the literature on school turnaround 
by using Continental Airlines’ turnaround success as a basis for school improvement.  
According to them, “there is a two-fold consequence for education’s failure to recognize 
turnaround as a means of school improvement—turnarounds have been tried rarely and 
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studied even less.”  In their analysis, “while education researchers catch up, practitioners 
can use the turnaround lessons of other sectors” (p. 22). 
 Senge et al. (1999) have observed starkly, “Failure to sustain significant change 
recurs again and again despite substantial resources committed to the change effort” and 
“there is little to suggest that schools, healthcare institutions, governmental, and nonprofit 
institutions fare any better” (p. 7).  Still Hess and Gift (2009) contend that this should 
“not deter schools from looking to these models for guidance as turnarounds have the 
potential to be a valuable tool for improving underperforming schools” (p. 2).  Senge et 
al. (1999), caution, however, that “the hope that we can systematically turn around all 
troubled schools—or even a majority of them—is at odds with much of what we know 
from similar efforts in the private sector” (as cited in Hess & Gift, 2009, p. 2). 
 Peck and Reitzug (2012) add to the body of research on how business 
management concepts are being transferred into leadership fashions in K-12 education. 
They examined Turnaround management, which emerged as a leading business 
management concept in the second half of the 20th century.  Their research found that 
Turnaround management gained momentum in the 1990’s in business literature, despite 
the criticism of leading businessmen like Warren Buffet, and showed early appearances 
in education literature just before 2000.  After the NCLB Act in 2002, Turnaround 
management was becoming a fixture in the educational sector as some of the popular 
educational publications like Principal, and leading voices in the field such as Duke, 
Leithwood, Cuban, and Fullan began to weigh in and endorse Turnaround as a viable 
strategy to saving our lowest performing school. 
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Mintrop (as cited in Leithwood, Harris, & Strauss, 2010) describes the 
relationship between the business concept of turnaround and school improvement this 
way: 
 
The corporate world uses profit margins and quality management results as their 
guide for determining decline while the school systems use similarly narrow 
criteria—student test scores in math and reading.  The move to standards-based 
tests to determine student and school-wide success continues to be challenged.  
One of the most important consequences of these changes has been the creation of 
an underclass of schools labeled and categorized as “in need of assistance,” “low 
performing,” “underperforming,” “in challenging circumstances,” “failing,” or “in 
special measures.” (p. 4) 
 
 The irony is that educators’ endorsement of a business model of reforming failing 
schools encouraged the federal government to adopt these measures as the standard for 
turning around 5,000 of America’s failing schools and thus gave legitimacy to the 
corporate rhetoric on school improvement.  This has, in turn, weakened the influence of 
school leaders who are actually involved in the challenging work of educating children 
and has made them expendable.   
Unpacking School Turnaround Reform 
 In order to see the relevancy of NCLB legislation to my study, one must 
understand the intricate workings of the policy and the sanctions it brings for failing 
schools. As stated previously, NCLB was “designed to identify schools that are 
consistently failing to serve poor and minority students and to instigate school-based and 
systemic remedies so that all students have access to a high quality, standards-based 
education” (Balfanz, Legters, West, & Weber, 2007, p. 559).  The act includes criteria for 
determining schools’ progress and consequences for insufficient improvement over time.  
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For example, after five consecutive years of inadequate progress, measured by 
meeting Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) targets, (now commonly known as 
Annual Measurable Objectives or AMO), NCLB requires that schools restructure 
through conversion to a charter school, replace staff, hire an external contractor to 
operate the school, invite the state to take over the school, or implement some 
other significant reform that fundamentally changes the school. (Huberman, 
Parrish, Hannan, Arellanes, & Shambaugh, 2011, p. 1) 
  
As outlined in the legislation, failing schools, “often characterized as 
dysfunctional or unstable,” undergo a series of reforms in order to improve student 
achievement for all students (Housman & Martinez, 2001, p. 2).  The problem with this 
definition is that the AMO targets are different in every state and these targets alone may 
not be sufficient to determine if a school fits the federal definition.  Therefore, a school 
could be considered low performing in one state but not in another, when, in fact, they 
very well may be failing subgroups of students.  Districts with schools that fall into this 
category have been lured into adopting these reform models because they are promised 
funding through SIG funds.  This funding is a competitive grant that awards millions of 
dollars to states so that they can improve conditions at failing schools.  The “catch” for 
school districts is that they have to adopt one of the school reform models in order to be 
eligible for the money as it is only earmarked for the lowest performing schools in a state.  
Since 2009, over 4.5 billion dollars has been committed through SIG funds to improve 
low performing schools throughout the country.  These funds are intended to pursue 
substantial changes using one of four models: 
 
x Transformation.  The principal is replaced.  Staff need not be changed but 
must be evaluated in part by their students’ outcomes.  In addition, the school 
must make changes in professional development, instruction, curriculum, 
learning time, and operating flexibility (school-level autonomy over budgetary 
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and staffing decisions).  This model assumes that the core instructional staff 
members at a failing school are competent but need new leadership, programs, 
training, and support. 
x Turnaround.  The principal and at least one half of the staff are replaced, and 
the instructional program is revised.  In addition, the school must implement 
new types of professional development, use data to inform instruction, expand 
learning time, provide wraparound services, and develop new governance 
structures.  This model also calls for operating flexibility for the school.  
Turnaround is designed to bring in new, highly qualified staff, as well as new 
programs, training, and support. 
x Restart.  The school is closed and then reopened under the direction of a 
charter or education management organization (EMO).  Restart assumes that 
private operators will foster greater innovation and improvement. 
x Closure.  The school is closed, and the students attend other schools in the 
district.  Closure is intended to offer students a better chance for success at 
another school. (Huberman, Parrish, Hannan, Arellanes, & Shambaugh, 2011, 
p. 1) 
 
“Since 2010, the SIG program has provided funding to more than 1,500 of the 
country’s lowest performing schools that have demonstrated the greatest need” (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2015b, p. 2).  The concentration of funding for this population 
of schools could be attributed to the fact that urban schools historically serve a more 
diverse group of students.  For school leaders, this means that they have the added 
pressure of ensuring that more subgroups of students meet AMO targets than principals 
in suburban schools that tend to be more homogeneous.  Out of those schools receiving 
grant funds, 169 of them adopted the turnaround reform model (U.S. Department of 
Education, n.d.).  The common thread in these four models relevant to my research is the 
replacement of the principal.  This implies that the responsibility for the school’s success 
or failure rests largely on the shoulders of the school leader. 
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Complexities of Turnaround Reform 
 “The concept of identifying and turning around underperforming schools has been 
central to the focus and intent of federal and state accountability provisions over the past 
decade” (Huberman et al., 2011, p. 1).  The problem of mediocre, low performing schools 
is affecting every aspect of our society and therefore federal and state governments have 
spent an exhaustive amount of time trying to remedy the situation.  “The U.S Department 
of Education has identified school turnaround, defined as dramatic improvement in 
student performance at schools with consistent trends of low achievement” (Knudson, 
Shambaugh, & O’Day, 2011, p. 1).  The appeal of school turnaround is that it 
 
offers the opportunity to take familiar educational institutions and improve them 
through coaching, mentoring, capacity building, best practices, and other existing 
tools.  Unlike most reform efforts, which focus on incremental improvement, this 
approach seeks to take schools from bad to great within a short period of time. 
(Hess & Gift, 2009, p. 1) 
 
The speed at which this change occurs is problematic since the common wisdom 
emerging from past school reform literature is that school improvement takes three to 
five years to achieve.  From the business world, those like Potter (1995) insist “the most 
general lesson to be learned from the more successful cases (of turnaround) is that the 
change process goes through a series of phases that, in total, usually require a 
considerable length of time.  Skipping steps creates only the illusion of speed and never 
produces a satisfying result” (p. 59).  Tirozzi (2013) cites the 
 
Breakthrough Schools Initiative, or BTS, sponsored by the National Association 
of Secondary School Principals, for its ability to identify successful schools and 
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attributes this to several factors, one major factor being the extensive time 
required for a turnaround. (p. 187) 
 
Despite its success, the program attributes its results to a program called Breaking Ranks.  
This program, which is endorsed and sold by the organization, ensures significant growth 
in student achievement, thus offering a one size fits all approach to school improvement 
that is not realistic when one considers the complex and diverse needs of schools.  
Additionally, Tirozzi’s association with the organization as the former Executive Director 
of the NASSP calls into question his motives for suggesting this as a viable strategy for 
reforming the countries lowest performing schools.  While the federal government relies 
heavily on a quick fix approach to school turnaround, the research favors a strategic plan 
of action that requires time not only in schools but in the corporate sector as well.  
However, in spite of the opposition, these reform strategies continue to prevail and affect 
the livelihood of school leaders across the country. 
Although these problems with school improvement exist, “at the same time, with 
the rise of high-stakes accountability and the subsequent increase in the number of 
schools deemed failing, turnaround efforts and accounts of these endeavors grow” 
(Murphy & Meyers, 2008, p. 254).  What is equally concerning is that “nearly all the 
turnaround in education leaps from problems (e.g., failure) to solutions (e.g., adoption of 
whole-school reform models) with remarkable little analysis of the variables and 
conditions in the school-failure algorithm” (Murphy & Meyers, 2008, p. 4).  This 
means that schools are rarely taking the time to determine what caused the decline that 
led to failure prior to reacting to save the school. “Most schools are not born low 
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performers.  Understanding how a school’s academic achievement begins to slip can thus 
provide important insights into the adjustments needed to reverse the process” (Duke, 
2006, p. 731).  Rather than rely on misconceptions about the reason for a school’s 
decline, such as the commonly used excuse “change in demographics,” Duke (2006) 
encourages a more critical look at the causes of decline in low performing schools and 
how these factors can serve as a springboard for school turnaround reform efforts.  The 
preference of these “knee-jerk” reactions to school improvement over critical analysis 
and problem solving raises questions about the criteria being used to justify replacing 
principals in low performing schools.  Action research, a rarely used tool in education 
reform, would reveal problems long before schools get in the turnaround phase of 
improvement.  In efforts to appease the public, however, action research has been 
sacrificed for immediate results.  
 The current trend in school turnaround reform puts schools under the spotlight 
once they are worthy of being mentioned on the evening news.  But failure does not 
begin when a school gains media attention.  For example, Oak Hill Elementary School in 
the Guilford County Schools District in North Carolina showed evidence of academic 
decline long before the school made headlines.  In 2008 the school was the lowest 
performing elementary school in the state.  In 2009 they became the lowest performing 
elementary school in the nation.  In fact, the schools in my study had been in decline for 
years prior to the districts taking initiatives to improve them by hiring my participants.  
This failure to act reflects a lack of urgency on the part of district leaders to enact change 
for students in low-performing schools before they were in a crisis situation and also 
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speaks volumes about the level of confidence district leaders had in the castaway 
principal prior to NCLB sanctions taking effect.  
According to Reitzug and Hewitt (n.d.), “High test scores are the coin of the 
realm in current turnaround policy, thus a focus on school improvement is a prerequisite 
for turnaround principal leadership” (p. 26).  Critics of turnaround reform, like Tirozzi 
(2013), believe this negative impact of No Child Left Behind Legislation thwarts the 
efforts of educators to endow students with critical thinking skills and dissuades teachers 
from the profession.  He argues that these kinds of “multiple choice assessment models 
do not account for students’ different learning styles, the context of their learning and the 
ambiguity of many test questions” (p. 177).  There are others in the field who share this 
concern for using standardized tests alone to determine the success of students, teachers, 
and leadership.  Trujillo and Renee (2012, 2015, as cited in Reitzug & Hewitt, n.d.) “have 
criticized turnaround policy for being undemocratic and limited to single indicators of 
effectiveness, (i.e., test scores)” (p. 26).  These scores are then published and scrutinized 
by the public who often do not possess the “educator eye” one needs to accurately 
interpret the results or make fair comparisons between schools.   Test scores used in this 
way not only create a skewed image of low performing schools compared to high 
achieving schools, but “such public accountability systems have created significant new 
pressures for the principal, who is often the only individual whose name is directly linked 
to a school’s academic performance” (West, Peck, & Reitzug, 2010, p. 251).  
Nevertheless, this reliance on production over quality appears to have taken root in 
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education since the inception of standards-based accountability models developed to 
improve student proficiency. 
Effectiveness of School Turnaround 
 To date, little evidence exists regarding the efficacy of school turnaround efforts.  
The U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences “practice guide” on 
school turnaround found “no empirical studies of requisite rigor demonstrating 
intervention effects or identifying factors that lead to successful school turnaround” 
(Herman et al., 2008, p. 4).  Stuit (2010), in his study of  
 
2,025 low-performing schools (257 charters and 1,768 district schools) across ten 
states, found that only one in five exited its state’s bottom quartile of proficiency 
after five years (including closures).  Turnarounds were rare: Only twenty-six 
schools demonstrated enough improvement to meet the study’s turnaround 
criteria, and the probability of turnarounds across all ten states was approximately 
1 percent. (p. 32) 
 
These dismal results point to the fact that much is still unknown about school turnaround 
and therefore policymakers should use caution when promoting this as a guaranteed 
method of reform.   
The scarcity of successful turnaround schools contributes to the skepticism about 
this method of reform for some of the nation’s lowest performing schools.  For example,  
 
one study of six reconstituted schools finds relatively negative near-term 
outcomes of school restructuring, including high levels of teacher turnover with 
experienced teachers often being replaced by first-year and non-certificated 
teachers, and only marginal adjustments in classroom practice (Malen et al., 2002; 
Malen and Rice, 2004; Rice and Malen, 2003, 2010). (as cited in Marsh et al., 
2013, p. 502)  
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These negative effects of school turnaround on not just the leader, but the school 
community, confirms what skeptics like Trujillo (2012) argue about school turnaround, 
which is that “through application of drastic personnel maneuvers, turnarounds “engender 
the exact conditions . . . linked with persistent low performance—high turnover, 
instability, poor climate, inexperienced teachers, and racial and socioeconomic 
segregation” (p. 1).  The limitation of case studies, according to Leithwood et al. (2010) 
is that  
 
while they are rich in detail and provide some insights, they reveal very little 
certainty about what works. . . . Furthermore, much of the research about school 
improvement has focused on schools that required a lift in performance rather 
than radical intervention; therefore, evidence informing the turnaround process is 
quite limited. (p. 13) 
  
 Although the research is emerging, there is documentation of some success of 
turnaround reform efforts.  Despite criticism, “U.S Education Secretary Arne Duncan 
announced that the first-year data suggest student achievement is on an upswing at 
campuses that have received a slice of the SIG pie” (Caroline et al., 2012, p. 1).  Three-
year data for Cohorts 1 and 2 receiving SIG funding report,  
 
Cohort 1 schools, which have implemented SIG reforms for three years (2010–11 
to 2012–13), increased the percentage of students who are proficient in 
mathematics by 8 and by 6 percentage points in reading. In Cohort 2 schools, the 
increase was 5 percentage points in mathematics and 4 in reading during the two 
years of SIG implementation (2011–12 to 2012–13). Cohort 3 schools increased 
the percentage of students who scored proficient in mathematics by 2 percentage 
points and by 1 percentage point in reading during their first year of SIG 
implementation (2012–13). (U.S. Department of Education, 2015b) 
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Contributing to this positive narrative, information released by the U.S. 
Department of Education (2012) reports the following: 
 
x Schools receiving SIG grants are improving. The first year of data show that 
two thirds of schools showed gains in math. And two thirds of schools showed 
gains in reading. 
x A larger percentage of elementary schools showed gains than did secondary 
schools, suggesting that it is easier to improve student performance at a young 
age than to intervene later. Seventy percent of elementary schools showed 
gains in math, and seventy percent showed gains in reading, a higher 
percentage of improving schools than was found in middle or high schools. 
x Some of the greatest gains have been in small towns and rural communities. 
(para. 4) 
 
Another more recent study reported that “turnaround reforms supported by the 
federal School Improvement Grants (SIG) program led to significant improvement in 
student achievement for students in California’s lowest-performing schools” (Dee, 2012, 
as cited in Marsh et al., 2013, p. 501).  When SIG funds were granted in 2010–2011 from 
the federal government to improve failing schools, California received the most funding 
of any state for two categories of schools—the “lowest-achieving” schools and “lack of 
progress” schools.  What they found was that these SIG-funded reforms improved the 
performance of schools on the lowest achieving boundary but not among SIG-eligible 
schools that were already making some progress (i.e., those on the ‘lack of progress’ 
boundary) (Dee, 2012, Abstract).  These studies should be referenced with caution as 
there are caveats to the progress that may not always be evident in sound bites used to 
justify restructuring of schools and replacing principals in failing schools.   
Examples of this conflicting data can also be found in the work of Reitzug and 
Peck.  In their examination of successful school turnaround results they found that 
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Research analyzing the academic outcomes and results of turnaround has also 
emerged; findings have been mixed at best.  For instance, while one study 
discovered academic improvement in elementary and middle schools in Chicago 
(de la Torre, Allensworth, Jagesic, Sebastian, Salmonowicz, Meyers, & 
Gerdeman, 2013), another study found a very low success rate of turnaround 
across the public and charter sectors (Stuit, 2012).  Further investigation done in 
this same study also found that even when schools did prove to be successful at 
meeting the requirements of turnaround, there was always the prevailing issue of 
whether this improvement would stand the test of time.  When researchers 
discovered cases of schools that demonstrated significant academic improvement, 
it was seldom sustainable (see, e.g., Aladjem, Birman, Orland, Harr-Robins, 
Heredia, Parrish, & Ruffini, 2010; Birman, Aladjem, & Orland, 2010; Stuit, 
2010).  Perhaps more concrete evidence if forthcoming now that this model has 
widespread acceptance.  In the near future, we will receive additional valuable 
findings from wide-scale studies underway regarding the efficacy of turnaround, 
such as the U.S. DOE-funded American Institute of Research’s 4-year Study of 
School Turnaround (Le Floch, 2011).  In the meantime, skeptics such as Smarick 
expressed concerns that “given unimpressive initial SIG grant results reported by 
the US DOE, the billions spent on turnaround were billions wasted. (Reitzug & 
Peck, 2014, pp. 5–6). 
 
Effective Principal Research 
 The role of the principal in this era of school turnaround has changed 
dramatically.  School leaders are forced to implement change in a limited amount of time 
and produce positive results, which defies the conventional training many of us have 
received.  This paradox forces us to search for a new skill set in order to be successful 
and escape termination. 
 
Two major obstacles to research identifying important skills to help principals in 
this area are data availability and the complexity of principals’ work.  Data 
suitable for doing rigorous empirical work in this area are scarce.  The other 
obstacle to developing a body of useful empirical work on principal effectiveness 
is the wide range of possible dimensions over which to describe principals and 
what they do. (Grissom & Loeb, 2011, p. 1092) 
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The principal’s role is not easily defined which is problematic in itself.  Regardless of this 
lack of a clear job description, school leaders are forced to possess skills they may not 
have when they enter high needs schools.  Corcoran (2012) confirms this in her research 
by saying,   
 
As educators move through this constantly changing landscape and the contextual 
educational problems that exist in schools today, the instructional leader must 
possess a vast array of competencies and skills to meet the day-to-day challenges 
they face. (p. 53) 
  
What we do know from the large body of research on school leadership is that it is 
key to a school’s success.  All roads to successful school performance lead to the 
effectiveness of the school leader.  Seashore Louis, Leithwood, Wahlstrom, and 
Anderson (2010) made the claim that “leadership is second only to classroom instruction 
among all school-related factors” in terms of student academic achievement (p. 6).  With 
such emphasis placed on the role of the principal, my study serves as a contribution to the 
literature in that it presents the conditions principals in low performing schools face that 
often hinder their ability to live up to these expectations.   
 According to Cai (2011), “it is reasonable to believe that the leadership of school 
administrators is a major factor of the success of school turnarounds” (p. 151).  While 
this may be true, it is also true that the definition of a “strong leader” is elusive and, no 
doubt, has changed over time just as the makeup of America’s schools has changed.  As 
school leaders grapple with this reality, Reitzug and Hewitt (2015) described this concept 
of being a strong leader as “both an ambiguous as well as problematic term” (p. 5).  This 
shift not only increases the pressure on school administrators, but it forces them to 
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constantly adapt to the role they play in ensuring successful student outcomes in low 
performing schools.   
 When it comes to the qualities that make them effective leaders, the literature is 
exhaustive with no one leadership style or skill being favored over another.  Hall and 
Simeral (2008) declare that 
 
The administrator has the ability to inspire, encourage, and activate the potential 
and output of every single teacher on staff. It is true that accomplishing this task 
requires a vast repertoire of skills and expertise. First and foremost, he or she 
must tackle cultivating relationships and building teachers’ capacity for success. 
(p. 105) 
 
We now know, according to Lambert (2003), that “a principal who is 
collaborative, open, and inclusive can accomplish remarkable improvements in schools 
and deeply affect student learning” (p. 44).  These qualities are not foreign to those of us 
who are practicing administrators.  In fact, many of these practices are standard in most 
graduate level programs.  The question, then, is if we know these strategies lead to 
success, what is hindering our effectiveness as building level administrators? 
In the debate over which leadership style is most consistent with the task of 
school improvement, Corcoran (2012) posits that instructional leadership and 
transformational leadership are the two that yield the most benefit in low performing 
schools.  Neumerski (2013) offers a more contemporary view of the principal as 
instructional leader by warning us against assigning this role solely to the principal.  She 
challenges us to rethink this idea of the instructional leader as an integrated method of 
leading that involves teacher leaders as well as coaches.  She posits that “each day others 
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work with principals to lead the improvement of instruction; a failure to expand our 
conceptualization of instructional leadership to account for this shared work seriously 
constrains our understanding” (p. 314). 
I agree that this is a much more realistic and collaborative way to engage in 
instructional leadership to improve failing schools.  However, the changes in the job 
description continue to challenge the expertise of school administrators and lead them 
away from these best practices to focus primarily on school improvement in a climate of 
accountability that is unprecedented (Neumerski, 2013).  Operating within these 
boundaries forces principals into a “leadership box” that limits all the other facets of their 
personality that should be nurtured rather than restrained. 
To Replace or Not to Replace 
 The question of whether or not to replace principals in low performing schools is 
just as controversial as the process of school turnaround itself.  There may be times when 
a school that is persistently low performing will continue to remain stagnant without a 
change in leadership.  “A failing school will need a new principal with a skill set suited to 
rapid and effective turnaround and a spirit of strong leadership and urgency to ignite the 
school’s effort” (Educational Resource Strategies, 2010, p. 50, as cited in Corcoran, 
2012, p. 60).  This advice to recruit the principals with the skills necessary to lead change 
comes at a time when the overwhelming and complex duties associated with the position 
are not attracting people to the profession.  Moreover, the talent pool that is willing to 
take on these difficult schools, as my research will show, are typically those who have the 
least experience.  
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 Central to the discussion of principal effectiveness in low-performing schools is 
the practice of replacing the principal once restructuring methods are implemented.  
Districts must adhere to this requirement in both the turnaround and transformation 
models in order to receive the SIG funding.  Leithwood, Harris and Strauss (2010) point 
out “poorly performing schools stand virtually no chance of turning around without good 
leadership” (p. 14).  Hess and Gift (2009) share this same opinion and encourage 
reformers “not to hesitate to change principals and school leaders to jump-start the 
turnaround process” (p. 3).  What is silent in the literature on school turnaround and 
school leadership are the experiences of those principals who are cast away to make room 
for the new principal who is charged with saving the school. 
 As these school overhauls are implemented, questions can be raised as to whether 
the responsibility for the failure of the school rests solely on the principal and his/her 
staff.  Even in the face of the previously-cited “experts,” there are skeptics of the practice 
of replacing the principal.  Kowell and Hassle (as cited in Leithwood et al., 2010) claim 
that “while the evidence is strong that a school’s leader makes a big difference on student 
learning in all school settings . . . understanding of the characteristics that distinguish 
high-performing school leaders from the rest is very limited” (p. 19).  Others support a 
model whereby the original principal is given support in order to become an effective 
turnaround principal rather than being terminated.  Tirozzi (2013) posits that “perhaps . . . 
the low performance [of a school] results from a combination of factors and inadequate 
leadership at various levels” (p. 186). 
33 
 
Since the turnaround movement is fueled by the business model, advocates of this 
approach also favor leadership change as a viable and necessary option in order for 
turnaround to be successful.  However, even at the corporate level, the concept of 
leadership change has mixed reviews.  As Grinyer and McKiernan (1990) correctly infer, 
“we should not assume, however, that a new chief executive is either necessary or 
sufficient to effect radical change” (p. 141).  O’Neill (1986b) shares the same sentiments 
by stating that “not all turnarounds require a change in top management” (p. 82).  Despite 
opinions from both camps on school turnaround policy, the replacement of the school 
leader is still supported by some organizational change/recovery research.  
 The research on replacing principals as part of the turnaround process has, not 
surprisingly, created conversations about the pool of qualified candidates to lead 
turnaround schools.  While the term “turnaround principal” is new, some educational 
leaders have been successful in reversing the downward spiral of beleaguered schools for 
decades.  Their numbers, however, are few.  Every principal is not necessarily capable of 
turning a school around (Hess & Gift, 2009).  This has prompted a call for training 
programs to prepare principals for the challenge of turning around a low performing 
school.   
 
For example, The University of Virginia’s (UVA) Curry School of Education has 
developed a co-curricular program designed to instruct experts charged with 
turning around consistently low-performing schools.  Operating jointly with 
UVA’s Darden School of Business, the program takes candidates from inside and 
outside education and equips “turnaround specialists” to tackle some of the state’s 
toughest schools. (Hess & Gift, 2009, p. 1) 
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Other relevant literature on this issue deals with the reality of the shortage of 
school leaders in the profession.  A 1998 survey conducted by the National Association 
of Elementary School Principals and the National Association of Secondary School 
Principals found that increased responsibilities, long work days, difficult parents, 
pressure from school boards, and low pay make the principalship less desirable than ever 
before.  Little wonder then that nearly half of the districts surveyed reported difficulty in 
filling their principal vacancies.  With 40% of the nation’s 93,200 principals nearing 
retirement age, finding qualified replacements will be even more difficult in the years to 
come (Potter, 2001, p. 34).  Pressures inherent in state and federal reforms, such as the 
No Child Left Behind Act, have also made the principalship less desirable.  Cusick 
(2003), concluded that there is a difference between the responsibilities that principals 
face as a result of “educational reforms” and the immediate task of running the school 
and addressing the strong desires of parents (as cited in Pijanowski, Hewett, & Brady, 
2009, p. 87).  The added pressure of being terminated or replaced due to school 
turnaround reform does not make the job more appealing by any means. 
 What we know from the literature on school turnaround and principal leadership 
is that it is a work in progress.  The infancy of the turnaround movement has schools, 
universities, and researchers troubleshooting multiple ways to deal with the chronic 
problem of failing schools across the country.  The rapid pace at which this change must 
occur has changed the way students learn, teachers instruct, and administrators lead.  Our 
reliance on the business model alone is not consistent with the literature on the success 
rates of such strategies in private sectors, let alone public institutions.  What we also 
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surmise from the research is that there are parts of the legislation that need reform if 
schools are in fact going to be turned around.  
These efforts have complicated the duties of the principal and forced him/her to 
become experts in unfamiliar territory, often with no sufficient training.  The added 
pressure of termination or reassignment due to school turnaround has implications for the 
profession and calls into question how these policies affect principals who are replaced 
and the principals who secede them.  As university programs are frantically trying to 
manage the need for more competent leaders by creating specialized programs to 
accommodate the demand for turnaround principals, the literature does not support the 
fact that they will be successful even after acquiring the expertise.  
The turnaround movement has taken the field of education by storm and the 
literature on this topic struggles to create a clear road map for policymakers and 
educators to follow.  The movement is a perfect example of the “building the plane while 
its in the air” analogy that is often used to describe programs or policies that are rolled 
out to the public before they have been vetted or properly understood by those charged 
with executing them.  We can continue to remain expectant that some good will arise 
from this era of reform.  Until then, as these policies continue to borrow from models 
outside of education that clash with what we know to be best practices for children in low 
performing schools, we will be left with a mingled version of school improvement that 
arbitrarily displaces children, teachers and administrators without much justification. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the experiences of principals who have 
been replaced due to the school transformation or turnaround model as outlined in federal 
No Child Left Behind legislation, or as a result of state or local efforts on behalf of the 
district.  This chapter highlights how the study was designed and provides a description 
of the population used to conduct the research.  The chapter provides information about 
the setting in which the study took place, data collection, and analysis of that data, along 
with the limitations of the study and how these limitations affected the outcome of the 
research.  This study examines how training, district support, attitudes surrounding failing 
schools, and social justice play a role in the experiences of replaced school leaders.  The 
study focuses on the following research questions: 
1. What are the stories and experiences of principals and their colleagues who 
were placed in high needs school, and subsequently replaced? 
a.  What kind of special training and support do principals in high needs 
schools receive prior to entering into these environments? 
b.  How does the school district support principals in high needs schools? 
c.  To what extent do principals who are fired due to federal policies possess 
a social justice orientation? 
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d. How should the experiences of principals replaced due to federal or local 
school reform models inform and impact education policy? 
Narrative methodology was used in this qualitative study.  I chose to draw from 
the narrative research method of Casey (1995), who advocates dependence on one broad 
question to gather comprehensive narratives from participants.  I employed Casey’s 
(1993) “Tell me the story of your life” approach because it makes the participants more 
than subjects answering questions.  This broad question encompasses much about the 
participants that would be lost by simply using pre-written interview questions that often 
lead the responses in a particular direction.  I extended this method and used a series of 
“tell me” questions that evolved as a result of their narratives so as not to steer the study 
in any one direction.  This approach gave my subjects an opportunity to share their truth 
but also to create a counter-narrative for a marginalized group—replaced principals—
who rarely get to share their side of the story when schools undergo radical reform.  
I chose this form of qualitative research because it is “based in the literature 
tradition of collecting narratives and analyzing themes in those narratives, as is done in 
literary analysis” (McQueen & Zimmerman, 2006, p. 475).  Although it has been 
criticized, this method of research has appeal because as Josselson (1993) writes, 
“Narrative . . . has intuitive appeal to people who become weary of variables and the 
quantification of the positivistic approach” (as cited in Casey, 1995, p. 212).  At its core, 
narrative research travels off the beaten path of conventional methodological etiquette 
and seeks to capture the lived experiences of people as they make sense of their lives and 
then use their stories to draw insight and construct meaning.  My methodology was 
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largely influenced by the oral history tradition, which, according to Yow (2014), is the 
“recording of personal testimony delivered in oral form with purposes beyond the 
recording itself” (p. 4).  Narrative research was the most logical method to use because it 
does not try to arrive at any truth based on facts.  The subjects’ stories in this study tell 
their truth as they saw it.  The accounts of their lives as principals and faculty members of 
high needs schools is told from their perspective, thus producing a constructed account of 
their experiences and not a factual record of events. 
  So often as researchers we become the masters of others’ stories rather than the 
listeners and observers of their truth.  Our academic training can sometimes become a 
hindrance when we reach outside the realm of traditional research methods.  It was my 
desire to have an organic encounter with each of the scapegoat principals that reflected 
their stories and not a version of their lives that I designed based on predictable questions 
that would steer the conversations in a particular direction.  Like Casey (1995), I was 
searching for a research method that would “honor the spontaneity, complexity, and 
ambiguity of human experience” (p. 218).  The Popular Memory Group (1982) describes 
it as “information that comes complete with evaluations, explanations, and theories and 
with selectivities, silences, and slippage that are intrinsic to its representations of reality” 
(p. 228). 
These questions served only as a guide that allowed participants to be as thorough 
as possible when describing their experiences (Table 1).  I did not ask all of these 
questions of each participant; however, I asked clarifying questions like these to ensure 
that they were able to look at their experience from a variety of perspectives.   
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Table 1 
Interview Guide for Principals and Colleagues of Principals 
Interview Questions 
1.  Tell me the story of your life. 
2.  Tell me what compelled you to work in a high-needs, low-performing school. 
3.  Tell me how your training prepared you for the position of principal in a high needs 
school. 
4.  Tell me what support you receive/received from the district after taking on this job. 
5.  Tell me what you regret most about the experience. 
6.  Tell me what you value most about the experience. 
7.  Tell me how you think the experience affected you. 
8.  Tell me who you blame, if anyone, for the outcome of your situation. 
9.  Tell me what you believe is the solution for low-performing schools. 
10. Tell me if you would do it all again given another opportunity? 
11. Tell me about working with (principal name) during the time when you were 
working to turn the school around. 
12. Tell me what you thought about his/her strategies for improvement. 
13. Tell me how you would describe (principal name) professionally and personally. 
14. Tell me what you saw him/her go through during the improvement experience. 
15. Tell me if you think the replacement was justified? 
16. Tell me how you felt going through this experience with (principal name). 
  
Definition of Terms 
 There are key terms that were used throughout this study that need to be defined 
in order to provide clear understanding for the reader.  These terms are as follows: 
High Priority Schools/Low Performing Schools—Schools become designated as 
low performing or low achieving (terms used interchangeably) as a result of registering a 
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performance composite (as measured by End-of-Course, End-of-Grade, or some form of 
standardized testing used by individual states).  In North Carolina schools that perform 
below 50% two of three consecutive years or have a graduation rate of below 60% in one 
of two previous years are considered failing (Wilkerson, 2014). 
Turnaround School/Model—School turnaround efforts are those actions taken at 
state, district, and school levels to improve student performance in the group of lowest 
performing schools (Dorman & Clotfelter, 2013, as cited in Wilkerson, 2014).  As a 
result of prior academic performance, a school receives its designation as a school to be 
turned around.  In short, a turnaround school is targeted for intensive support geared to 
re-culture or restructure a school with persistently low achievement levels as measured by 
End-of-Course/End-of-Grade tests or graduation rates.  The schools receive tiered levels 
of support ranging from instructional coaching or leadership coaching to central office 
support (Dorman & Clotfelter, 2013, as cited in Wilkerson, 2014).  
Social Justice Theory— 
 
Theory focused on advocating, leading, and keeping at the center of vision and 
practice issues of race, class, gender, disability, sexual orientation, and other 
historically and currently marginalizing conditions in the United States. 
(Theoharis, 2007, p. 223) 
 
Study Setting and Participants 
I used several strategies to choose the participants for this study.  My first strategy 
was to review a list of schools in the state of North Carolina that had undergone the 
grueling process of school restructuring that involved replacement of the principal.  Once 
I identified those schools I used the information to personally locate the former principals 
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who were terminated.  Another method I used was the referral method.  Using my 
network of principals, and other colleagues in education across the country, I contacted 
them to help me locate those colleagues they knew personally who have been the victim 
of school turnaround efforts.  Lastly, I reached out to those principals I knew personally 
in order to solicit their stories of being replaced.  
All interviews took place in agreed upon locations between the researcher and the 
subjects, at times convenient for both parties, and where conversations could be held 
discreetly and confidentially.  The interviews were held over a 12-month period.  I 
separately interviewed four replaced principals for a total of 8 hours of interviews with 
principals.  I also interviewed colleagues who worked closely with these principals for at 
least an hour. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
After participants were interviewed these interviews were transcribed and coded 
according to the research questions I used.  In line with narrative and oral history 
methods, I analyzed the data to detect common themes, slippages and silences that 
occurred across each of the interviews all the while searching for some unifying 
practices, characteristics, external and internal conflicts that either contributed to the 
principals’ demise or that hindered their ability to be successful at turning around their 
failing schools.  All data gathered was kept confidential.  Pseudonyms were used to 
protect the identities of those interviewed.  The interview questions were used as 
clarifying questions for principals.  The colleagues of the replaced principals were not 
asked to tell me the story of their lives as the study does not directly focus on their lives, 
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but rather their professional history working with the principal participants in this 
research.   
Subjectivity and Positionality 
As a school leader in a high needs school I recognize the challenges principals in 
these kinds of situations face and therefore I do not deny the impact this may have on my 
study.  My positionality may cause me to relate to the subjects, however, I was able to 
successfully lead my school to improvement when it was failing several years ago, which 
is something the subjects in my study were not able to do according to the turnaround 
reform guidelines.  Therefore, while I remain sympathetic to their situations, I also 
understand that school turnaround can happen with the right leadership.  Currently I am 
again faced with leading the school to success after state re-norming of standardized tests 
has taken place.  So I am now again in the position where my own job could be at risk 
and the board could decide to employ school turnaround strategies to improve the school.  
All of these dynamics could influence my findings and conclusions and I take ownership 
for this as I believe disconnecting myself from the research would be irresponsible and 
unrealistic. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the findings of my study.  The purpose of 
this study was to share and examine the experiences of “scapegoat” principals—
principals who were replaced because they were the designated leaders of low-
performing schools.  This study used narrative methodology to collect the stories of these 
principals and social justice theory was used as a conceptual framework.  Four principals, 
along with four colleagues who worked with them in their low-performing schools, were 
interviewed between summer 2015 and spring 2016. 
These principals were chosen based on one criterion—they had all served as 
principals in high needs, low performing schools and were removed from their positions 
after failing to improve test scores.  During my research, I discovered that those 
principals who have suffered the fate of replacement were not often willing to share their 
stories.  As a result, I included the perspectives of teachers and other staff members as 
well.  These colleagues were recommended to me by the participating principals in order 
to determine if their perspectives were consistent with those of the principals’, and to 
offer insight into the effects of principal transition on not just the principal but on the 
staff as well. 
 This chapter begins with a brief overview of the academic and demographic data 
of each of the schools under the leadership of the participants.  Common conditions that 
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place schools in the low-performing category include “a correlation between community 
poverty and stress on the organization of the school” (Corallo & McDonald, 2001, p. 2)  
Another common characteristic, and undoubtedly the most critical in terms of how states 
and districts are determining principal effectiveness, is that low performing schools “do 
not meet the standards established and monitored by the state board of education, or some 
other authority external to the school” (Corallo & McDonald, 2001, p. 2).  The data in the 
tables are included as evidence that all four schools meet the criteria established to be 
considered low-performing.   
The chapter includes a brief biography of each principal before presenting a 
thematic analysis of their narratives.  The narratives of their colleagues are interwoven 
throughout the chapter to provide corroboration.  The combination of the stories of the 
principals and their colleagues assist in answering the overarching research question that 
guides this study, “What are the stories and experiences of those principals who are 
replaced due to school turnaround reform methods?” 
 Each principal participant in the study was interviewed for one and half to over 
two hours.  Each colleague of the principal was interviewed for a minimum of one hour 
for a total of approximately fourteen hours of interview time spent with all participants.  
All the principals are currently still administrators except for one who chose to retire 
rather than be terminated.  Each principal served as a leader in a low-performing, Title I 
school immediately prior to their scapegoat experience.  The ages of the principals at the 
time of the interviews ranged from the early 40s to mid-60s, with each of the participants 
having over 20 years of experience in education at the time of these interviews.  
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Meet the Captains 
   Courtney is a white woman in her early 40s who began her career as a middle 
school science teacher before becoming a school principal.  When she took her first 
principalship, she had two years of experience as an assistant principal.  Prior to 
becoming the leader of Old Forest Elementary, named low performing, she was a 
principal for four years at a non-Title I school within the same district.  She spent four 
years at Old Forest Elementary before being replaced.  Her school data are presented in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Old Forest Elementary School Data 
Year Reading Math Status 
2006–2007* 70.7% 50.8% Priority School 
2007–2008** 14.8% 32.4% Low Performing 
2008–2009 24.1% 39.2% Low Performing 
2009–2010*** 34.1% 59.5% Low Performing 
Note. AYP Target goals to meet 43% Reading, 77% Math. 
* Principal started at the school. 
** Tests were changed and scores declined significantly across the state. 
*** Student demographics of students tested the final year the principal was at the school. 
Demographics: 84% Minority; 37% LEP; 26% EC; 98% Free or reduced lunch. 
 
Melinda is also a white woman in her mid-60s approaching retirement.  She began 
her educational career as an elementary teacher and went on to hold curriculum facilitator 
positions prior to completing her Masters in School Administration and becoming an 
assistant principal.  After three years as an assistant principal she was appointed principal 
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at a low-performing elementary school in her district.  She served at the school for five 
years before being replaced.  The data for her school is shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Tate Street Elementary School Data 
Year Reading Math Status 
2005–2006* 68.0% 45.4% Priority School 
2006–2007 66.9% 51.4% Priority School 
2007–2008 26.3% 57.8% Priority School 
2008–2009 34.7% 67.1% Low Performing 
2009–2010** 38.8% 62.9% Priority School 
Note. 2009–2010 AYP Target goals to meet 43% Reading, 77% Math. 
Priority School: 50%–60% of students performing at grade level. 
Low Performing: Less than 50% of students performing at grade level. 
* Principal started at the school in 2005. 
** Student demographics of students tested the final year the principal was at the school. 
Demographics: 90.4% Minority; 35% LEP; 11% EC; 95% Free or reduced lunch. 
 
Stephanie is a black woman in her early 40s.  She began her teaching career as a 
long-term sub until she could successfully pass the teacher’s exam in her area.  After 
passing the required examinations, she entered a school administrator’s program 
sponsored by her district at a local university and became an assistant principal while in 
this program.  Halfway through her first year in the program she was appointed principal 
of Cedar Chest High School, a low performing high school in her district.  She served as 
the principal for three years before being replaced.  The data for her school are presented 
in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Cedar Chest High School Data 
Year Proficiency Graduation Rate Status 
2006–2007* 45.9% 80.5% Priority 
2007–2008 41.4% 75.9% Low Performing 
2008–2009** 47.5% 66.8% Low Performing 
Note. 2008–2009 AYP Target goals to meet 39% Reading, 68% Math.  
* Principal started at the school in 2005. 
** Student demographics of students tested the final year the principal was at the school. 
Demographics: 89% Minority; > 1% LEP; 15% EC; 69% Free or reduced lunch. 
 
Samuel is a black man in in his early- to mid-50s.  He is a product of the school 
system in which he worked.  He began as a teacher and went on to hold a variety of 
district level instructional leadership positions before accepting the principalship at 
Augusta High School.  He experienced success as a turnaround principal at a neighboring 
high school before going to Augusta High School.  He served as the principal of the 
school for three years before being replaced.  The demographic and academic data 
appears differently from Stephanie’s high school because the two schools are in two 
different states.  These data represent conditions at the school during his tenure (see 
Table 5). 
Chapter IV incorporates the responses of each participant during our interview 
sessions.  An analysis of each of the principal interview transcripts revealed 88 codes 
with an average of 40 codes for each transcript.  After organizing the different codes 
discovered in these transcripts, five themes emerged from the data, along with some 
significant findings revealed during the coding process that, although they were not 
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developed into themes, were complementary pieces of their narratives that aided in 
creating a more complete picture of each participant.  In line with the title of this 
research, nautical theme titles are used to represent the different stages in which these 
school leaders matriculated from teachers to principals in challenging schools.  The 
additional findings are included in order to provide more critical insight about the 
participants that I believe is very important in understanding their experiences. 
 
Table 5 
Augusta High School Demographic Data 
 
Year 
 
Math 
 
ELA 
Graduation 
Rate 
Status/ 
Performance Grade 
2012–2013 72.2% 49.1% 60.9% D 
2013–2014 78.4% 48.5% 61.2% D 
2014–2015* n/a n/a 66.6% D 
Note. New assessments implemented in 2014-2015 indicated overall proficiency rate of students on the 
English 10 and Algebra I assessments was 45.4%; data from previous year cannot be compared to this 
year’s data. 
* Student demographics of students tested the final year the principal was at the school. 
Demographics: 83.4% Minority; 13.5% LEP; 16.9% EC; 63.1% Free or reduced lunch. 
 
The first theme, “First Mate: The Path to Leadership,” primarily deals with 
participants’ backgrounds and their varied paths to becoming educators and leaders.  
The second theme, titled “Aye, Aye, Captain!: The Call to Administration,” is where each 
of the participants shares their story of being chosen by the Superintendent to improve a 
low-performing school and their willingness to accept such difficult positions and their 
own thoughts about their ability to be successful.  The third theme, “True North: Getting 
to School Improvement,” gives an in-depth look at the grueling work it takes to 
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implement school change in order to positively impact student achievement.  The 
participants share their efforts to improve school culture, instructional practices and the 
support, or lack thereof, they received from their district leaders.  The fourth theme, 
“Going Down with the Ship: Principal Commitment and Replacement” emerged from the 
conversations with the scapegoat principals.  It is here where the participants shared the 
organic, personal stories of how the challenge of turning around a failing school affected 
them emotionally and professionally.  This perhaps was the most meaningful part of my 
research and where the participants were able to be the most transparent during the 
interviews.  The final theme, “Survivor Island: Life After School Turnaround,” represents 
their lives after replacement and how they found peace and purpose after their perceived 
failure to improve their schools.  
First Mate: The Path to Leadership 
 Participants were asked one broad interview question, “Tell me the story of your 
life.”  All but one of the participants started their life story with their education or career 
in education.  In line with the format designed for the interviews, I was able to ask 
clarifying “tell me” questions of the participants, which in this case was to tell me about 
their lives before education and where their desire to work with Title I children comes 
from.  This question elicited very detailed descriptions of their pasts that they attributed 
to their decisions to go into education and work with marginalized populations.  Samuel 
was the only participant who began his story with his childhood experience and family 
influence.  In his response he said, 
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Well I was born and raised in this state, in this city . . . we lived in a very inner 
city urban neighborhood.  I know what’s right and I know what’s wrong, my 
parents taught me, gave me a wonderful work ethic, as they did all my brothers 
and sisters, but out of all eight of my brothers and sisters I’m the only one that’s a 
college graduate.  I’m a survivor, I grew up in the middle, I grew up in the middle 
of that neighborhood.  I worked hard all my life.  I went to an all-white school 
where they threw bricks at us and spit on us, you know.  
 
He affirms his commitment to equity by saying,  
 
I was that child.  My brothers and sisters were that child—were those children, 
my nieces and nephews are those children, you know, my children could have 
been those children.  They’re a fabric of who I am.  They are part of me, they’re 
part of my identity.  And if I didn’t help them, then who’s going to? 
 
 When asked the same question about her identity before becoming an educator, 
Courtney seemed to have an epiphany as she detailed the events surrounding her 
development from childhood through adulthood.  It occurred to her as she shared her 
history that her family had been quite influential in helping to establish her ideas of 
equity and acceptance even as a young child.   
 
I grew up in a very small town.  Both my parents were small business owners, so 
my life consisted of being at a drug store 24/7, other people taking care of me, the 
community raising me.  We would ride the bus in the afternoons to the high 
school, switch buses and go to my dad’s store over on the other side of town, so in 
the day time at school I was with all the white kids and then the afternoons in play 
time I was with the black kids.  I knew everybody because that’s where we all 
mixed and so that was a unique quality about me and my family is that we did 
know, everybody knew, who we were. 
 
She goes on to describe how family encouraged her sense of fairness and 
tolerance by saying, 
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But where my dad’s store was, was right in the poor section of town so all the 
kids I ever played with and grew up with, that’s who I played with, that’s who I 
associated with, you know.  I didn’t associate myself with the other country kids 
and all that, that’s who I felt like I belonged with.  My parents raised me to accept 
everyone no matter who they are. 
 
Melinda, from an upper middle class family, attended private schools as a child 
and as a college student.  She shared similar sentiments in her narrative about her desire 
to teach and work with high needs children: 
 
I grew up in a small town.  My mother was a high school English teacher.  I went 
to private schools all my life, and when I had the chance to take up on a minority 
scholarship from a historically black university, I really looked at that as opening 
and broadening my perspective in education.  My mom taught at one of the low 
performing schools in the state.  My sister’s a teacher, too, she teaches at a Title I 
school, so I think my mom just raised two girls that just wanted to be like her and 
have a career of being a teacher in schools that have high needs.  So that, I’m 
truly convinced that’s where our desire came from, it was modeled for us, so we 
just followed in that footstep.  I don’t know that I could be at a non-Title I school. 
 
Finally, Stephanie’s story aligns with the others when it comes to how the 
influence of home shaped her as an educator and advocate for social justice for at risk 
students.  She shares,  
 
I grew up in a bigger city, so, you know I consider myself a lot more accepting of 
people and things that were open-minded than I think most people.  So when I 
came here it was, obviously when I came here it was very much a culture shock to 
me.  I guess it’s kind of in me.  My mom is a retired elementary school teacher, 
my dad is a retired probation or juvenile probation officer, so I think that dealing 
with children is in my blood.  I think education was always kind of in my blood.  I 
always knew I was going to college, that’s always been a part of me.  My parents 
instilled that in me and my brother’s a teacher. 
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Each participant spoke of their past as the major influence in their decisions to 
become educators, and specifically educators in high needs schools.  Samuel shared his 
story of being from a working poor household and a neighborhood not known for 
producing scholars.  He was able to beat the odds however, and this drives him to try to 
make this same thing happen for poor children of color.  He clearly sees himself in the 
faces of his students, which adds another layer of responsibility to his already difficult 
job of improving student achievement in his school. 
Courtney was the product of a successful working class family where college was 
encouraged.  Both parents were college educated and her family was considered the local 
bourgeoisie among both white and minority families.  Her upbringing provided her with 
choices that many of her peers did not have.  This luxury of choice helped Courtney 
realize at a young age that she was privileged although her peer group was not.  Even 
though she could not relate to them and their way of life, the experience provided her 
with a lens through which she saw poverty and spurred her sense of obligation to do her 
part to eradicate it when she became an educator.  
For Melinda, the distance between her life and the life of the poor around her 
created a desire to widen her perspective.  Having lived a fairly sheltered life, as an adult 
she took the first opportunity she could to leave the comfort zone of private schools that 
had been chosen for her by her mother and go to a university that offered a more diverse 
environment.  This craving to be among the “others” she attributes to the strong work 
ethic instilled in her as a young child and her mother being a teacher in a low performing 
school.  Although her mother worked with the poor, she educated her children in private 
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schools creating an interesting paradox for Melinda that she overcame by being dedicated 
to working in low performing schools as a teacher and administrator.  
The participant with the most diverse upbringing was Stephanie and because of 
this, she embraced all kinds of students.  She ultimately became an administrator in a 
high-poverty, low-performing school, which was very different from her life.  She came 
from a middle-class family where different cultures were a regular part of her life because 
of the area in which she lived.  She speaks of the struggle she had with the southern way 
of living when she arrived in the South and describes it as a culture shock.  While her 
past may have prepared her for working with people from all walks of life, her direct 
experience in life was not that she came from poverty or even understood poverty.  Her 
connection with children from poverty was not evident in her childhood, so she relied on 
her connection to education and children, through her parent’s modeling, to guide her 
desire to work with disadvantaged populations. 
This portion of their narratives proved to be valuable in answering my research 
question, “To what extent do principals who are replaced due to turnaround federal 
policies possess a social justice orientation?”  Their responses add validity to the work of 
Marshall and Oliva (2010) who posit that “school leaders with a strong orientation 
towards social justice and equity issues had this instilled early in their lives by 
parents/significant adults whose actions regarding these issues were unequivocal, 
consistent and passionate” (p. 121).  This area of the research is critical because it would 
be extremely difficult for these principals to lead in high needs public school 
environments without some sense of moral responsibility for their students’ success.   
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Lack of moral responsibility for the outcomes of students in high needs situations 
could be an obvious reason for derailment of a school principal in a low performing 
school.  However, all four participants possessed not just a surface awareness of their 
populations, but they each felt compelled to work in these environments because of a 
sense of duty or calling to be where they were most needed.  Their investment in their 
students’ well-being, in and out of school, resonated throughout their narratives.  This is 
explored further when the participants discuss how they put this calling into practice as 
they worked to transform their schools.   
Aye, Aye, Captain! The Call to Administration 
In their study of ten turnaround principals in a Turnaround Specialist Program at 
the University of Virginia, Burbach and Butler (2005) state, “every superintendent 
knows, the single most important factor in turning around an academically low-achieving 
school is the selection of the right principal for the job” (p. 24).  Contrary to this study, 
the scapegoats’ descriptions of how they answered the call to go into failing schools 
reveal selection processes that do not align with what is cited as best practice for 
choosing a principal for a low-performing school. 
From the Classroom to the Principal’s Office 
In this section of the chapter we begin with Stephanie’s story because she had the 
most non-traditional path to becoming a school principal of the four participants.  
Stephanie entered the education field without the acceptable credentials.  Although she 
was a graduate of an accredited school of education program, she was not a certified 
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teacher when she began working in her current school district.  Despite this, she was able 
to overcome this obstacle as she describes below:   
 
I started two years at a middle school, and it took me a good couple of times to 
pass that middle school praxis.  I was out and subbing for about a year and a half I 
believe it was while I studied and retook the praxis.  I was like a permanent sub 
and some teacher left or something like that.  I finally got on in the teaching 
capacity once I passed the praxis.  
 
After successfully obtaining her teaching license while substituting, Stephanie 
almost immediately entered a Master’s program in school administration that was paid 
for by her district as a “home grown” initiative to produce more principals with in the 
district.  Her appointment to an administrative position came fairly quickly as told in her 
narrative: 
 
So I am four years teaching, maybe a little more than a year into the MSA 
program becoming an assistant principal.  After a year, not even a year and a half 
at that school, he (her principal) gets a call from the superintendent for me to 
become the principal at Cedar Chest High School. 
 
The other three participants shared a more familiar, predictable story of their 
experiences from the classroom to the principal’s office.  They each plotted their 
positions very meticulously during our interviews.  Samuel, the only male participant, 
had the most experience and the most decorated resume.  He was the only participant 
who had held a district leadership position prior to becoming a school principal.  In his 
interview, he shared: 
 
I did my student teaching at the school where I was [later] replaced [as the 
principal].  I taught in the school system for eighteen years before leaving the 
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classroom.  I was a dean of students for four years.  I was assistant principal at a 
middle school.  I was assistant principal in charge of student services at a high 
school.  I was the director of middle schools in the district.  The then 
superintendent asked me to become the principal at another low performing 
school.  I worked there for four years.  After saving that school the superintendent 
sent me to Augusta High School. 
 
The white women participants had the most closely related experiences as they 
both worked their way up the leadership ladder by becoming teacher leaders in their 
respective buildings.  Melinda and Courtney’s narratives mirrored each other in the 
following ways:   
Melinda says,  
 
I was really enjoying being a third-grade teacher.  I just really enjoyed teaching 
and he (her principal at the time) said I’m gonna make you a lead teacher and 
you’re gonna do nothing but model lessons and work with the teachers.  So I did 
that for a couple of years and then he was the same principal that said what about 
an AP?  Well you know, been out of the classroom then for three or four years 
doing pure curriculum and instruction so he’s the one that really talked me into it, 
at the same school that I was in for fifteen years, so I was a teacher, a curriculum 
facilitator, lead teacher, and an AP, and then that’s when I got the call.  I was 
moved to Tate Street Elementary. 
 
Courtney responded in this way, 
 
I did a year-long student teaching.  I was a teacher at a middle school in the 
district, Title I.  I also started my master’s program at the same time, so she (her 
principal at the time) was like well, if you want to be a principal I’m going to 
throw you in, come on.  So I—she kept inviting me to observe things before I was 
even into that internship time, she just made me want to do it even more.  Then 
we go from that, I’m moving to that school, here again, I’m seen as kind of one of 
the leaders of the school but also she pushed me into SIT team and this team and 
that team I was only an AP for two years, and then became principal (at her first 
school).  I was there for four years and loved it. 
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Every scapegoat principal followed the classroom to principal pipeline to 
leadership.  According to Baker, Punswick, and Belt (2010), “Principals leading K-12 
public schools today most often ascend to their current position after being employed as a 
classroom teacher” (p. 526).  This gateway to administration through teaching, according 
to Rand (2004), “has become a somewhat standard prerequisite for building level 
leadership that is universally understood in the profession” (as cited in Baker et al., 2010, 
p. 526).   
You Don’t Say So 
Interestingly enough, Samuel was the only one of the scapegoat principals who 
seemed to make a seamless transition from teaching into administrative roles without 
much prompting.  The three female principals were encouraged by others to develop their 
leadership talents while they were teachers, while the male participant seemed to march 
right into the role as though it was expected.  This is consistent with the research of 
Syvertson (2002), who found that “female principals do not specifically plan their careers 
and training with the goal of being an administrator; rather, it is an option that presents 
itself as opposed to pursuing the option from the early stages of a career” (as cited in 
Baker et al., 2010, p. 527).  This could suggest that male principals, like Samuel, have 
their eye on leadership and pursue these positions and obtain them at a greater rate, 
therefore contributing to the literature on the gender gap between men and women in 
school administration positions.  What was more intriguing is that none of the 
participants spoke of administration being their ultimate goal as educators.  Although 
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they willingly entered school administration programs, none of these scapegoat principals 
spoke of an overwhelming desire to serve in education on this level.  
 A common language of servitude emerged from the narratives of the female 
participants that was not present in the experience of the one male participant in the 
group.  All the female principals described a kind of “summoning” to the position rather 
than being asked if they actually wanted to take on the role.  Stephanie describes her 
appointment this way: 
 
Here I am getting a call from the superintendent, or my principal did, about me 
becoming a principal at this school, which I knew little about.  I don’t know how 
much you knew about the former superintendent’s tenure, but everyone knew that 
you couldn’t—you didn’t say no, if he called and said for you to go here, there, 
wherever, you said yes for fear of being blackballed.  You told him no, you 
declined a position, and he wanted to put you up regardless of what it held, you 
would be blackballed, and that kind of, that was the kind of culture he created in 
the school system at that time.  I can’t remember if I talked to him or not.  In fact, 
I honestly can’t.  
 
Courtney, a principal in the same district as Stephanie describes her call to the 
principalship in the following way: 
 
The superintendent at the time, he called me into his office, and he said Courtney, 
you’ve done really good at your current school, but we have a school that needs 
you, and I’m like okay, didn’t tell me anything else, just a school that needs you, 
and you’re going to Old Forest.  Did not tell me all that it was, you know what 
I’m saying, so talk about a total shift, but it was where my heart was, you know, I 
was missing my Title I babies, but I had no idea what a mess that school was in.  
You do not tell that superintendent no, plain and simple, you do not tell him no.  
He said you were going to Old Forest, you’re going to Old Forest, yes sir, what 
time, what day, you know what I mean? 
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Melinda, from a neighboring district describes her placement like this: 
 
I got a call my fifth year as an AP from the superintendent at the time, and he said 
I’m moving you to Tate Street Elementary as the principal, they’re failing.  Do I 
have a choice?  He said well think about it, I’ll give you 24 hours and you need to 
call personnel and let them know.  I didn’t interview for it, had no idea, did not 
seek it, whatever.  I didn’t know, I was a young AP, had babies and kids, you 
know, so I took it.  I didn’t think I had a choice, yeah, not with him.  You just sort 
of, you just said yes or no and went on your way, you didn’t really ask for another 
placement, it wasn’t the environment at the time and the board was supporting 
that, so you really did not have anywhere to go. 
 
Superintendent leadership style played a critical role in their experiences.  As their 
narratives reveal, there was a shared fear of refusal among these women.  All of them 
mentioned the future of their careers being in jeopardy and the climate of obedience to 
the superintendent that was present in their districts.   
I would like to suggest here that issues of gender played a major role in the female 
principals’ feelings of intimidation and, thus, how they responded to their superiors.  The 
role of the subservient woman dates back to biblical ages and that role, even today, is one 
that women continue to combat.  Historically, men have held the majority of leadership 
positions in education leaving the teaching to women.  As women climb the career ladder 
and achieve positions as school principals, the likelihood that they will still have a man, 
usually a white man, as their supervisor, is a common phenomenon.  As more women 
enter the principalship under the supervision of men, the pressure is there to prove 
themselves worthy of leading and to represent for other professional women.  I believe 
the women in this study felt compelled, as much as they felt coerced, to take these 
positions to make their “mark” as women administrators within their districts.   
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Their desire to dispel the myths about a woman’s ability to succeed over their 
male colleagues and somehow be considered equal in the eyes of the superintendent 
possibly drove their decision to accept the positions as well.  Another factor to be 
considered is the superintendents’ ability to manipulate the feminine ethics shared by 
most female principals.  As mothers, wives and partners, we tend to be nurturing 
individuals.  This is confirmed in the work of Kruger (2008), who posits that “in general, 
research into leadership styles has found that women are a bit stronger in relationship-
oriented supportive styles, while men score higher on instructive and controlling styles” 
(p. 162). 
Each of the women said that their superintendents used phrases like “the school 
needs you” presenting a picture of children in trouble that they undoubtedly knew would 
appeal to their compassionate and caring nature.   
Samuel speaks of his appointment to not one, but two failing high schools, during 
his career in terms that do not denote fear or feelings of being obligated to bend to the 
superintendent’s will.  When he received his school leadership positions he says: 
 
The then superintendent asked me to become the principal another low-
performing school in the district which is located on the west side.  He sent me to 
Augusta where I had gone to high school, so I became principal at Augusta High 
School. 
 
The overriding fear of not being considered for future positions dominated the narratives 
of the female principals.  On the other hand, the male participant did not seem to share 
the same kinds of fears about his career and progressed from one position of leadership to 
the next with ease.  The culture of the districts these principals served in, according to the 
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female participants, nurtured this kind of top down management style that compelled 
them to accept these positions regardless of whether or not they felt prepared.   
Too Much Too Soon 
Experience prior to becoming a school leader is something that is not only 
necessary, but expected in some districts.  The demands of the profession can be 
overwhelming for experienced administrators, let alone novice principals.  Each of the 
participants served as assistant principals prior to becoming leaders at failing schools.  
What is interesting about their stories is the amount of time each served as assistant 
principal and the kinds of schools in which they served before being “tapped” for the 
principalship. 
 Melinda, although and educator for fifteen years, was an assistant principal for 
just five years in a Title I school before she was moved to Tate Street Elementary.  
Stephanie was an assistant principal in a non-Title I school for less than two years prior to 
her appointment.  Courtney was an assistant for two years—one year at a non-Title I 
middle school in a neighboring district, and the other year within the district in a Title I 
elementary school as a novice assistant principal.  She served for only four years in a 
non-Title I elementary principal before being place at Old Forest Elementary.  Samuel 
served in administrative positions for five years, including a district level director 
position before his superintendent sent him to Augusta High School. 
 Although there is no research that dictates the experience principals need to have 
prior to taking on the role of school leader, Baker et al. (2010) posit that “schools that 
struggle to show adequate student achievement share some building leadership 
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characteristics” (p. 529).  One of these characteristics, according to Papa, Lankford, and 
Wyckoff (2002) state that “schools where students performed poorly on standardized 
exams are much more likely to have less experienced principals” (p. 2).  Not only are 
student outcomes affected by the experience of the principal, but in a study conducted by 
Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2013), the researchers found that “schools with a high 
proportion of low-income students are more likely to have first-year principals and less 
likely to have principals who have been at the school at least six years than those serving 
a less-disadvantaged population” (p. 67). 
In light of this research, we see a serious flaw in the selection process when it 
comes to appointing leaders in failing schools.  Superintendents tend to choose those 
candidates who have the least amount of experience to lead in the most extreme 
circumstances.  Logic would assume that these appointments would be given to the most 
highly effective and skilled principals in the district, as well as those who had a track 
record of success, like Samuel, in improving low performing schools.  On the contrary, 
three out of the four principals interviewed in this study met none of these criteria.  So the 
question then becomes, why are superintendents placing novice principals in such 
positions?   
The answer may be in the results of a study conducted by Davis et al. (2005), 
commissioned by the Wallace Foundation that states, 
 
the issue has less to do with dwindling supply (of highly qualified principals) than 
with the inequitable distribution of qualified candidates in suburban and affluent 
communities.  In California, for example, the problem is not a shortage of 
certified administrators, but a shortage of highly qualified administrators with a 
commitment to working in underserved communities and schools. (p. 5).  
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These data suggest that there is a talent pool of school leaders unwilling to tackle the 
overwhelming work involved in transitioning schools like the ones led by the participants 
in this study.  More troubling, however, is the fact that superintendents are not using the 
same tactics to coerce them into taking these positions, leading one to assume that the 
career of the experienced principal is valued more in local school districts than that of the 
novice principal. 
Obvious reasons for this phenomenon are evident as the sanctions placed on these 
schools and the pressures on the leader make them less attractive.  In addition, as 
Stephanie suggests in her narrative, failure to meet the requirements of school turnaround 
stipulations can be career ending.  Those who have their eyes on promotion to better 
schools within the district and central office administration avoid these types of 
placements and typically are not tapped for these positions.  In their study on principal 
effectiveness, Branch et al. (2013) found that 
 
a school that serves largely affluent families may create the illusion that it has a 
great principal, when family backgrounds are the key cause of high achievement.  
Alternatively, a school that serves disadvantaged students may appear to be doing 
poorly but in fact have a great principal who is producing better outcomes than 
any other principal would. (p. 64) 
 
Therefore, a valid argument can be made for re-visiting the benchmarks used to 
determine the professional future of principals who enlist in the schools that have the 
most need versus those who do not.  Novice principals who are taking on the 
responsibility of turning around a low performing school are suffering extreme 
64 
 
consequences for their obedience to the superintendent, while those who are fortunate 
enough to avoid these “bad” schools within the district continue to advance.   
I Wish I Had Known More 
Coupled with experience, or the lack thereof for these participants, was the degree 
to which each of the participants felt they had the capacity to do the job effectively.  
Melinda shared this,  
 
I was a young AP (Assistant Principal).  So there I am, no experience, I mean I 
was an AP, as AP I was used to just getting things done—where’s the bus 
schedule, where’s that math schedule, how-who we were hiring, discipline, how 
many suspension days, what’s the law say, policy about.  I had not worked on per 
se vision, mission, collaborative vision, relationships per se.  I always had that 
principal doing it and here I was striving (to be that person). 
 
Courtney shared these same feelings of inadequacy in her interview.  Below she 
said, 
 
I was only an AP for two years and then became principal.  I do kind of wish I 
had more AP under me, experience, only because I think there were some things 
that I wish I would have known more of, but that’s okay.  I learned when I got in 
the job. 
 
Stephanie, the participant with the least amount of experience of all the 
participants in the study, echoed the same ideas about her promotion: 
 
I knew really very little about Cedar Chest, new to the state, pretty much only like 
a year, like I said, a year and a half into the Masters of School Administration 
program, pretty much new to administration. 
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The women in this study all admitted their lack of self-confidence going into these 
positions.  Although a certain amount of anxiety is to be expected when taking on a new 
challenge, there was a common idea shared among them of gaining the skills needed to 
do the job after getting into the position.  This on-the-job-training motto is not sufficient 
when the expectations for the principal in turnaround schools are so high and come with 
such dire consequences when they fail.  On the other side of the spectrum are principals 
like Samuel.  He was the only participant who did not seem to hesitate when asked to 
lead in failing schools within his district.  He describes his call to the role in this way, 
 
Well I think I was asked to go there because I understand, I have a number of 
strengths.  So all of these were my attributes and the superintendent saw this and 
he knew that I could turn the school around. 
 
Overwhelmingly, Samuel showed the most confidence about being placed into the 
position and his capacity to deliver results.  He never wavered in his opinion about his 
ability to turn the school around during my interview with him.  I found Samuel’s poise 
to be predictable based on the research cited earlier about the ambitions of male 
administrators and their dominance in the field of education leadership.  At the same 
time, after listening to Samuel tout his many strengths and skills, it seemed probable that 
his confidence could have been mistaken for arrogance, thus adding legitimacy to his 
replacement by his superiors.  I would submit, however, that those like Samuel who 
possess this kind of self-awareness could be the candidates needed for the position.  It is 
obvious from my research that many principals are entering failing schools with little 
66 
 
knowledge or skill to be successful.  Therefore, when someone like Samuel comes along, 
perhaps their security in their abilities should be welcomed rather than punished. 
You Learn It on the Job 
As the principals continued to tackle the challenges of improving student 
achievement in their underperforming schools, the subject of training and professional 
development was key in understanding the capacity each had to perform the work needed 
to effect change.  When asked whether they felt their graduate level work prepared them 
for the position of principal, the scapegoat principals cited their college preparation 
programs as having some impact on their practice, but agreed that the coursework was 
not effective in preparing them for what they would face in their new roles as turnaround 
principals. 
Courtney describes her graduate preparation in terms of the course that was most 
relevant to what she was encountering in her own experience.  She reflected on her 
education by saying: 
 
I would say my doctoral work with one professor because I remember specifically 
him talking about derailment.  I don’t know that the research and all that other 
stuff helped me as much with that particular situation, but it’s come in handy with 
other situations, but definitely that about the superintendency and derailment.  I 
just reflected a lot on that one when I was going through it. 
 
Stephanie speaks of her master’s program and its ability to prepare her for the 
work of turnaround in this way: 
 
Theory, it was more theory versus with what I was doing, it was much more 
theory than what I was doing.  I finished the master’s program in two years, in 
2004 and I started at Cedar Chest in official capacity in 2005.  There was a lot of, 
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you know, writing papers about leadership, how to lead, but most of my training 
was on the job training.  It wasn’t necessarily based on anything that I’d learned, I 
learned different developments of leadership, I learned different methods of 
leadership.  It was more so it was on the job training for me. 
 
Samuel attributed all his administrative skills to his personal and professional 
experiences and gave no credit to his educational preparation.  He describes his college 
influence in this way: “No, I think growing up in an urban environment receiving an 
urban education and teaching in an urban environment prepared me the most.”  Melinda 
cites one course, as did Courtney, as having the most effect on her practice, however, like 
most of the participants, she does not credit her master’s program for much beyond this 
one course, 
 
School law, that’s it.  That’s it.  I had to pass his exam, that really is, that really is 
where I learned, now me, personally, where I learned to be an administrator was 
by being an AP.  But School Law, I still have the book, it was one of the best 
courses at the university that I took.  My internship was fabulous.  Once you get 
in that school that’s where you learn it. 
 
This opinion that university school administration preparation programs did not 
sufficiently prepare the participants for turnaround leadership reflects the research done 
by Dodson (2014), which states that 
 
Nationwide, school officials have criticized Principal Preparation Programs 
(PPPs), for not ensuring that graduates are “ready” for principalship. They often 
claim that students graduating from college and university PPPs lack the skills to 
step right in as effective leaders; instead, they need too much on-the-job learning. 
(p. 42) 
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As an increasing number of principals are faced with the possibility of having to lead 
high needs schools, this points to a weakness in the university to principal pipeline that 
could have serious effects on the future of the candidate pool needed to lead our schools 
successfully.   
Delayed Resources 
Kelley and Peterson (2000) posit that 
 
preparing individuals to become principals involves much more than just 
recruitment, preparation, licensure, and placement.  Indeed, ongoing evaluation 
and supervision and coaching and continuous career-long professional 
development are critical strategies to ensure that schools are led by effective 
principals. (p. 20) 
 
Despite this, the professional development and training opportunities for each of these 
scapegoat principals serving in under performing schools was not consistent with the 
research in this area.  The interviews revealed a wide range of professional development 
experiences for the participants.  For example, Melinda spoke in detail about a series of 
targeted trainings that were eventually made available that addressed her needs as a new 
principal of a turnaround school.  She describes the professional development she 
received in this way:   
 
By the third year I got the letter that all principals in the lowest performing 
schools would need to go to a local university.  I went for six months and did a 
six-month series of turnaround elementary school practices.  We went through 
everything that you could possibly go through, master scheduling, hiring, every 
part of it, and I probably left there more trained than I have ever been before as a 
principal.  The training had speakers from Colorado coming in and PLCs, if you 
will, DuFour, Pattie, Poppum, was just—they were just hitting the scene, so we 
were trained by the DuFour’s, Richard DuFour and his wife came in and trained 
us.  We had a leadership training in relationship building, we did True Colors, we 
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did the Myers-Briggs test, we did finding your leadership style, we did self-study 
analysis, we kept a journal, we had homework, we read research articles. 
 
Courtney recalled her professional development and training as a new principal 
charged with turning around a failing school in a completely opposite way: 
 
In terms of me as an administrator, I was always, I was being told everything I 
wasn’t doing right and never being told what I needed to do to do better unless I 
did it exactly the way he (her direct supervisor) wanted and I’ve already told you, 
there were things I didn’t agree with, so that kind of, I felt like I didn’t get 
support.  I want someone, I mean to me support is a two-way street, you give me 
feedback, I learn from the feedback, I ask questions, you, you know, it’s a give 
and take. 
 
Stephanie had a similar experience, and ironically, contributes her professional 
development to the dreaded state assistance team assigned to her school.  Her description 
is as follows: 
 
I didn’t feel like the school system itself had given me enough support in terms of 
allowing me enough time to grow, any support in terms of from curriculum and 
instruction, bringing in people from the different departments to help me, you 
know, put structures in place, the school was in shambles, and so if you’re talking 
about structuring in a way to reform and bringing me in brand new and wanting 
me to do, you know, rebrand this building, then give me the tools that I need and 
the support I need, knowing that I really don’t have any experience to do it 
myself.  
 
A key point that should be highlighted in their narratives about their exposure to 
professional development is the delayed response, and in some cases no response at all, to 
the professional needs of these principals and their staff.  Melinda spoke of this support 
coming from the district after her third year.  Courtney described a very negative system 
of support she was offered that did not aid her at all in helping to lead improvement at her 
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school.  Finally, Stephanie had to rely on the state for her professional nurturing because 
they realized she was not receiving any support at all at the local level.  
Each of the women openly admitted in their interviews that they lacked the skills 
needed at the onset of their appointments.  Nevertheless, they did not receive the training 
and support needed on day one of their entry into the schools.  Literature supporting the 
importance of the professional growth of school leaders is in abundance.  Due to the 
complexities of the job, principals must continuously stay abreast of best practices in 
education in order to grow and change as the position of the school leader continues to 
evolve.  To deny turnaround principals immediate access to quality professional 
development, after thrusting them into some of the most neglected schools in the country, 
sets them up for failure and contributes to the lack of skilled principals willing to work in 
the schools that need them most.   
Samuel made no reference to any professional development opportunities that 
were provided to him as a turnaround principal.  It could be assumed, based on the spirit 
of his narrative, that due to his background as a central office administrator, perhaps he 
was the only person who went into his experiences with the knowledge base to handle a 
turnaround school.  Conversely, his replacement raises questions about whether or not 
even district level administrators are up to the challenge of improving low performing 
schools.  The various professional development experiences of the other three 
participants also point to inconsistent practices between districts in the same state that 
may have implications for policy changes that should become a part of the school reform 
movement. 
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I Found Myself by Myself 
Their first-year experiences, as cited, were void of real tangible support for these 
principals after they were appointed to the positions.  I found this especially troubling 
considering the enormous responsibility placed upon them to turn their schools around.  
The assumption could quite easily be made that these principals placed in some of the 
most at risk schools within their districts, (and some within the state), would have 
unlimited resources and a level of intervention from the central office that would rival 
that of other schools simply based on need.  
 However, as their stories unfolded during the interviews, it was revealing to 
discover that they all struggled through the process of school improvement in some 
shape, some never fully receiving any assistance from the district at all.  In Samuel’s 
story he even describes the district as a hindrance to the changes he was trying to bring 
about at Augusta High School.  He shared this in his interview: 
 
Our boys’ basketball team did something that, and our school’s 102 years old, 
were never able to do in 102 years, they won the state basketball championship.  
First state basketball championship that the school had ever had in 102 years.  
First state basketball championship that the city had had in 40 years.  They did not 
allow us to have a rally after we won the game, which is traditional statewide, you 
always go back to the school and they said that it would be violent.  
 
 This failure to support the school did not end here.  Samuel describes more 
incidents like this below: 
 
Every school is allotted the state alternative education budget.  Normally we 
receive $241,000, and you write your budget how you’re going to spend that, 
okay?  They put this white lady in charge and we did not receive our budget.  I 
needed that remediation money so I could set up the afterschool remediation 
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programs during school and all the alternative programs.  They didn’t want to 
give me that money, anything, any resources that I was supposed to get they 
didn’t want to give to me.  They wanted to see me fail.  They wouldn’t give me 
enough teachers, anything they could do to make me fail they would. 
 
Stephanie spoke very candidly about her feelings of abandonment from the 
district office.  Desperate for help from her district, she turned to her state assistance team 
for direction, mentoring, and grassroots strategies to turn her school around.  She 
described her relationship with the central office in this way,  
 
I really used them [her state assistance team] to my advantage and really gained 
relationships with them that helped me in terms of a lot of things that I was able to 
get because they would—they didn’t see the superintendent favorably, they saw 
how he wasn’t giving me the support, so when they wrote their report to him to 
the state, they also put in the report the support that I didn’t receive from the 
school system, you know, to let people know that I wasn’t getting what I needed.  
 
Courtney described similar feelings of being left to fend for herself at her low 
performing school.  She described her entrance into Old Forest Elementary this way, 
 
I didn’t have an AP.  We also had that autistic continuum starting at age four all 
the way up, and they were inclusion, so you had autistic children in all that mix, 
too.  We had the regional sites for Behaviorally Educably Handicapped.  Yeah, 
you’re like seriously, you put all that and no AP?  There was no support, none, I 
mean I had the superintendent giving me the vocal support and the personal 
support, but the physical support was not there, you know.  Title I can only buy 
you so much.  You can only get but so much out of that, and it’s not getting you 
all you need. 
 
When expressing her feelings towards the direct supervisor assigned to her school to 
assist her through the turnaround process, the experience was more combative than 
collaborative and she attributes the setbacks the school experienced, as well as her own 
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demise, to his lack of support for the work she was doing at the school.  When speaking 
of him she said this, 
 
Now my supervisor he was the downfall for most of those teachers.  He came in 
and he was very judgmental, never had any experience in Title I before he was 
involved in this school, and didn’t understand what it means to be working in a 
Title I school.  He went through every single teacher and he would tell me this 
one needs to be in on an action plan, this one doesn’t, this one—he made me put 
people on action plans when I didn’t agree with it.  There was one teacher vividly 
in my mind that he wanted me put on an action plan just because he didn’t like 
her hair, and I refused, and when I refused to do what he said, that’s when I 
became a scapegoat, that’s when I became the negative to everything, because I 
refused to ruin people’s careers just because he didn’t like them, had nothing to 
do with their teaching and I’m like, ‘no.’ 
 
In her interview, Melinda shared the turmoil surrounding her first year as a new 
principal at a failing school and how the district itself was left without direction as a 
newly appointed superintendent came on the scene.  Although she was afforded some 
support her second year, she shared her first-year experience below:   
 
So needless to say, the first year at the school was rough.  The superintendent 
came in and he talked to me one day and he said how much support are you 
getting?  I said well, none that I know of, and he said well here’s what we’re 
gonna do, we’re gonna go over to square one, you’re staying here and you’re a 
good fit here, he said you would not have survived your former school for 15 
years and done what you did there.  You have something for this place, but you 
need support.  What are you getting?  I’m like nothing, I was just placed here, you 
know. 
 
 Careful review of the mission and vision statements from the participants’ 
districts reflects a commitment to high student achievement.  Statements claiming to 
graduate career and college ready students, achieve educational excellence, engage 
students in a variety of academic and social experiences, and support them in each of 
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these endeavors so that they are successful in life are reiterated multiple times in the 
various plans available on their websites.  Despite this, there was a consistent theme 
among the participants of having a lack of support from the district, or a delayed sense of 
urgency in order to make these goals a reality. 
True North: Getting to School Improvement 
 
Each participant entered their new position with a degree of determination that, 
despite the doubts that some of them had, coupled with their lack of preparation, 
compelled them all to accept the challenge of school turnaround.  What was revealed in 
the interviews points to a series of common obstacles and accomplishments that without 
fail, the scapegoat principals and their colleagues all repeated when describing the work 
involved in school improvement.  This section addresses this work and how the scapegoat 
principals and their staff members reflected upon this very difficult task. 
 As the responses of the principals are cited, the interview responses of their 
colleagues regarding their leadership and the turnaround process are included 
periodically.  The areas of focus include school climate and culture, student discipline, 
teacher quality and staff development, district support, and student achievement.  The 
issue of time and effort is embedded within the student achievement section and 
addresses the problem with time restraints mandated by turnaround legislation and the 
idea of principal effectiveness across Title I and non-Title I schools. 
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Clean Up Year 
 According to MacNeil, Prater, and Busch (2009), 
 
When the complex patterns of beliefs, values, attitudes, expectations, ideas and 
behaviours in an organization are inappropriate or incongruent the culture will 
ensure that things work badly. Successful school principals comprehend the 
critical role that the organizational culture plays in developing a successful 
school. (p. 74) 
 
Without fail, each of the scapegoat principals spoke of the first year being a “clean up” 
year because the climate and culture of the schools was so poor when they arrived.  
Rather than focus on instructional improvement, instead they were faced with school 
culture and climate issues that had to be addressed before learning could take place.  
There were varying degrees of the “clean up” phenomenon revealed in their interviews.  
The issues they faced ranged from basic facility conditions to overarching micro-political 
conflicts which all had negative effects on the school environment.   
 Samuel describes his first year at Augusta High in this way: 
 
I went into that school, the teachers were in survival mode, and when I say 
survival mode, they were simply trying to make it through the day.  With the high 
turnover rate.  The attendance was a major problem in an urban school.  Violence 
is another interesting factor that people don’t recognize that plagues our schools.  
Bullying is one thing, but then you have a whole different scope of violence.  The 
sexual diseases that was spread, you know, we had to open clinics.  Because first 
of all we had law and order, we made the kids do what they were supposed to do.  
I simply had to clean it up. 
 
Samuel’s colleague, Grace, describes similar conditions when Samuel became the 
principal, 
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When I first went there I was an instructional coach, five, six years ago, and I 
hated going there because the alarms were being pulled two or three times a day 
in one building, okay, so the destruction of the learning was definitely there.  It 
was a gorgeous campus but you know, it wasn’t a safe campus.  He actually took 
the learning environment and made it safe and made it structured in terms of kids 
get to class on time, if you’re running around campus, the police would snatch 
you up or administrators would get you, then you would have some type of 
consequence.  By the time he left it was probably the safest high school in the 
district—and that was after year one—it was the safest high school. 
 
Stephanie, the other high school principal in this study, describes her entry into 
the principalship at Cedar Chest High in this way: 
 
So my first year was spent just trying to undo a whole lot of things that had been 
done at Cedar Chest.  The school was out of control, no stability in terms of 
administration, teachers very disgruntled, just—it was a very chaotic situation, a 
lot of damage control needed to happen, the school stayed in the news often.  I 
liken it to the movie Lean on Me, where the school was just literally out of 
control.  Test scores down in the dumps, white migration where it was—had 
formerly been a school known for academia.  The demographics had totally 
changed.  
 
 
 Stephanie’s colleague, Amanda, describes in her own words the climate and 
culture of the school and what Stephanie was up against in the early stages of turning the 
school around in the following response: 
 
She was working with a lot of opposition, and it was just nearly impossible, in my 
opinion, for her to do what she needed to do with the limited staff she had.  She 
was putting out fires every moment of the day.  She was putting out fires with the 
students because we had high gang issues and oftentimes situations from the 
neighborhoods spilled over into the school, so we had constant fighting.  I can 
look back now and I can laugh about it, but it came a point towards the end of my 
career there where I literally buckled my keys on my waist because I never knew 
when the school might go into lockdown or was going to be a fight, and these kids 
would fight to the death, it was horrible, the ambulances were always there 
because somebody stabbed somebody.  
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Unfortunately, in Stephanie’s case, her problems did not just come from the 
student body but from the teaching staff as well.  The fires Amanda refers to also 
extended to adult issues that Stephanie was forced to correct in her new role as principal.  
She described these conflicts this way, 
 
I can remember staff getting into arguments right in front of students, we had 
situations, unfortunately, where a band teacher and a director both were involved 
with female students, it just to me felt like she was in a sinking boat and nobody 
was really giving her the help that she needed, so putting out fires just became her 
way of living. 
 
 Melinda describes her first year like this: 
 
So the first year I had to deal with misconceptions, public perceptions, a new 
superintendent, one leaving, one coming, I had to deal with staff, an AP that was 
very angry that I was there, a staff that was divided, it was rough, it was rough. 
 
Melinda’s colleague, Nancy, spoke of the climate and culture more in terms of 
the transience of the students and how that hindered their academic progress more than 
the micro-political issues that Melinda encountered when she arrived.  Although the lens 
through which she saw the school atmosphere was different from Melinda’s, the culture 
of the school Nancy describes is legitimate from a teacher’s point of view and relevant to 
student success.  Nancy described the environment this way: 
 
You know, like I said, for Tate Street it’s about proficiency, that is where we 
struggle, we have a lot of students in and out, they may move—they are with us 
for a little while, they may move, they may come right back.  I know that’s 
something that she spoke of a lot as if we could teach our students that we get, 
you know, the first ten days of school, and keep them, try to, you know, work out 
ways to keep them there. 
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Courtney echoed the same kind of first year turmoil as the other principals in her 
response: 
 
That first year I had to focus not only on getting control because it was out of 
control with the kids, it was chaos, discipline was out of control, we had drugs, 
we had fights, we had the cops at the school every week with something, every 
week with something, gangs, I mean kids were wearing gang colors and beating 
up each other based on what they wore, that first year it was crazy. 
 
As in Stephanie’s case, the adult issues were equally consuming as the 
student-related matters for Courtney at her elementary school,  
 
Had facilities issues, the custodians were fighting each other, literally I broke up a 
fight between adults one time that first year, ended up firing everybody in the 
custodial role, because it was also not clean.  I had 25 teachers I had to fire that 
year, and I’m not talking action plan, I’m talking found them with inappropriate, 
immediate, walk out of the building, take your keys kind of stuff.  Some of them 
were staff members, doing things that were just inappropriate.  I had one person 
that I walked in the classroom and she was bopping kids on the back of the head 
and calling them assholes, I’m like, no.  So that first year it was just me cleaning 
up a mess.  There was no instructional leadership at all because I had to focus on 
cleaning up, getting the chaos under control. 
 
 Her close colleague, Dana, also described a similar kind of environment and 
specifically cited instances when Courtney was actually harmed physically her first year 
at Old Forest,  
 
We had some gang problems and she dealt with that, like she put, I want to say 
she put SMOD (Standard Mode of Dress) into place where, you know, we didn’t 
have the gang colors anymore.  We had to have some restraints because kids 
would hurt themselves.  She got beat up several times.  I had a kindergartner that 
we had to clear my classroom almost daily because he would start throwing things 
and he stepped on her foot after she’d had surgery and totally undid all the 
surgery and she never said a word other than he stepped on my foot. 
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 These principals’ efforts to transform the culture of their failing schools is 
evidence of the non-academic factors that these turnaround principals must tackle that are 
consuming but necessary.  According to Kaplan and Ownings (2013), 
 
Unless teachers and administrators act intentionally to re-boot the culture of their 
school, all innovations, collegiality, shared decision making, high standards, and 
high-stakes tests will have to fit in and around existing cultural elements.  
Although any type of change presented to schools often meets resistance, 
implementing new approaches without considering school culture will remain no 
more than crepe and tinsel, incapable of making much of a difference. (p. 3) 
  
The condition of these schools when the principals arrived is evidence that they 
had been in crisis long before these scapegoat principals took control.  It is important to 
understand this because we often adopt deficit assumptions about why schools are failing, 
often blaming the students and families for the school environment.  However, as 
Marshall and Oliva (2010) point out, “inequitable outcomes often result from systemic 
organizational practices and policies endemic to schools and administrator practice that 
have not been analyzed or acted upon with respect to their impact on nonmainstream 
students” (p. 7).  As a result, their instructional leadership was not evident the first year 
because they were all struggling to just create basic processes and systems that would 
allow teaching to occur.   
Teacher Survival 
 
 If leadership is considered one of the most important factors contributing to a 
school’s success or failure, then teacher quality, without doubt, has to be the key factor in 
determining student achievement within the classroom.  The research on teacher quality 
shows “that the quality of classroom teachers has the greatest impact on the performance 
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levels of students” (Evers & Izumi, 2002, p. xiii).  As these principals operated as change 
agents in their buildings, a large part of the work involved making sure competent faculty 
and staff members were in place to reverse the negative or mediocre teaching strategies 
that had been used until they took the reins of leadership.  An unwanted side effect of this 
duty was the increase in teacher turnover.  Through the work of Simon and Johnson 
(2015), we know that “when students are repeatedly taught by new teachers, they pay a 
substantial price year after year in the quality of instruction they receive” (p. 5). 
While some of the participants did speak of having some control over terminating 
employees, there was little said about the decision-making power they had to re-hire 
quality teachers to replace them.  To compound the work of transforming the school, 
these principals had to develop human resource skills in order to recognize good teachers 
and recommend them for hire.  Ultimately, these school leaders became responsible for 
the professional development of these new and veteran teachers when their skills proved 
to be insufficient. 
In her interview, Stephanie spoke of her efforts to improve teacher quality in the 
face of a very disgruntled and veteran staff resistant to change.  While she did not 
mention terminating teachers, she did speak at length about how her assistance team was 
able to help her provide professional development for her teachers: 
 
They [the assistance team] came with teaching and learning support, they helped 
me with professional development for our teachers, they helped me with 
pockets—they were able to really get in there and so some observing, helping me 
and my administrative team with teachers who needed additional support so just 
anything I needed.  Do you want us to bring in some professional development, 
what do you think about this idea, sitting down and helping me devise, I think—
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well you know, I think we need this particular set of teachers or I think we might 
need this for this set of teachers. 
 
 Once again, Stephanie gave credit to the state assistance team, not the central 
office, for her own understanding of how teacher quality affects student learning.  
However, there was no mention, specifically, of what trainings or newly adopted 
strategies, methods, or programs were adopted that addressed these deficiencies in their 
teaching.  Interestingly enough, her colleague Amanda paints a different picture of the 
quality of the teaching staff as she describes below the obstacles she faced in trying to 
build capacity in her teaching force to increase student performance: 
 
In order to turn the school around she needed additional help.  I think she had a lot 
of great ideas, I really do, I just don’t think she had the tools to do what was 
necessary with the population that we were serving.  I think that she definitely 
needed more reading coaches, math coaches, she needed a—I would say stronger 
EC department.  The second year she had a high turnover rate with staff, and that 
caused her to have to bring in young inexperienced teachers.  That’s not a good 
thing when you’re working with a high needs school. 
 
 It is no secret that high needs schools typically have a high percentage of 
inexperienced teachers.  This perception of the improvements in teacher quality from 
Amanda’s point of view could reflect her lack of involvement at the administrative level 
in the behind scenes collaboration between Stephanie and the assistance team.  It could 
also shine a spotlight on a more troubling internal disconnect between the expectations of 
the district and what is being required of principals at the building level to improve 
failing schools.  Both Stephanie and Amanda spoke of the small growth the school did 
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achieve during her tenure as principal, but both agree that more could have been done if 
the professional development needs of the staff had been more of a priority. 
 Samuel spoke in detail about the lack of skill of the teachers in his building when 
he arrived,   
 
I had a social studies teacher that loved to show movies.  I had a PE teacher that 
well, was scared to death of those kids.  So they were getting ready to retire, so 
they had offices on the side of the gym, they’d throw out three basketballs for the 
black kids and three soccer balls for the Hispanic kids, and go in the office and 
shut their door.  I had another geometry teacher, and all he’d do is sit at the 
overhead and talk to the kids, I said what, how do you check for understanding?  
You would not believe what he told me.  He said because I could see it in their 
eyes if they understood or not.  And the ones that couldn’t handle it left, and the 
ones that were going to do it my way stayed. 
 
 Samuel attributed his own expertise and skill to the improvements in teacher 
quality that led to his school getting off the state probation list.  It would appear that he 
single-handedly had to improve the teaching conditions in his school when he said in his 
interview,  
 
I can walk in a classroom and I can tell whether these kids are understanding what 
it is that the teacher is teaching.  I can also tell the level of instruction.  I can also 
tell whether this teacher has prepared.  I can also tell whether this teacher is 
checking for understanding at a high level.  I also can do professional 
development to help these classroom teachers become a better teacher. 
 
 
 In talking with his colleague Grace, she reflected on the strategies employed to 
improve the quality of instruction and school performance in a slightly different way.  
She painted a picture of a principal who took a team approach to correcting gross 
deficiencies in teacher instruction in the classroom.  She had this to say,  
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Well the great thing was he kind of valued staff input, so I got to sit on weekly 
meetings every Monday with instructional coaches I’m a compliance coordinator, 
so the compliance coordinators and the instructional coaches got to sit around the 
table and do a lot of collaboration and planning and brainstorming of what needed 
to be done and where we were with different parts of the plan.  We were a part of 
the administrative team, but at some point we all kind of had to collaborate more 
together and then, you know, we had professional learning communities.  He was 
a type of person that when he was in charge of Augusta High School he allowed 
staff members to kind of, not do their own thing but if you had an idea he would 
support it if it was logically sound and research based. 
 
 These different accounts of how improvement in teacher quality evolved at 
Augusta were very interesting.  While Samuel presented a unilateral, top down approach 
to providing support for teachers in the classroom, Grace remembered a more 
collaborative approach that valued teacher input and her own expertise as part of the 
administrative team.  This could be viewed as a slippage in how the professional needs of 
the staff were addressed, again, based on their positions.  It could possibly be indicative 
of a common theme in Samuel’s narrative of being the savior-like figure of the school 
committed more than anyone else in the school to the success of the students.  This sense 
of personal responsibility could emanate from his own experience as a child from poverty 
who sees himself in his students.  
 For Melinda, the professional development of her staff appeared to be supported 
by the district office, however it was delayed.  When speaking of the support she received 
to improve teacher capacity she said: 
 
We offered an incentive for teachers to work there, gave them an extra week of 
pay, ended up doing some Kagan training, five days before school started all 
teachers got five extra days and went through cooperative learning five days, 
really transformed the school, very transformative.  I went for six months and did 
a six-month series of turnaround elementary school practices with the curriculum 
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director at CO and with a curriculum facilitator, the three of us went, I think we 
read 15 research books, we had homework, reports due.  We went through 
everything that you could possibly go through, master scheduling, hiring, every 
part of it. 
 
Courtney painted a picture of professional support for her staff with less 
enthusiasm.  She described the support her staff needed below: 
 
I couldn’t get any help from like instructional services and professional 
development to help my teachers grow further, it was basically if I didn’t have the 
money in Title I to buy the people I didn’t get people, coaches, and so forth 
because they were assigned to other schools, then that’s the year that we made it 
onto the list and so that next year we got tons of support.  But it was like I 
screamed for a year, I need help! I need help! I need people to help me with basic 
lesson planning all the way to classroom management, but I was by myself, you 
know, I wanted help from other people from instructional services and I just 
couldn’t get it because we weren’t the people who were assigned to get it at the 
time 
  
The colleagues of these principals were not able to contribute as much information about 
the kind of support that was being offered from the district.  Only two of them had input 
on how they viewed the support their principal was receiving.  In both cases, the 
perception of their colleagues was congruent to what the scapegoat principals shared.  In 
Dana’s view, while Courtney was providing the professional support her staff needed, 
this was not being reciprocated towards her from the central office.  She had this to say, 
 
We had tons of professional development and it was good.  Some of it we paid 
for, some of it the district paid for, but it was good stuff, and she made sure we 
had what we needed.  Her hands became more tied whereas before she made 
decisions based on what she knew was best, decisions were made for her towards 
the end, and they weren’t always the best decisions for our staff and our kids.  I 
loved it my first four years and my fifth year 14 teachers were put on a plan.  I 
cried every single day.  It was hard.  They just, they did not have her back.  She 
would ask for help and they would not give her any, like she would go and say I 
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need help, I am having a problem in this area, and no one would help her, I 
mean—and she was just like what am I supposed to do? 
 
 When speaking of Stephanie’s experience at Cedar Chest, her colleague Amanda 
personally described her decision to support Stephanie in this way, 
 
I showed up to meet her, she was frantic because a fight had taken place, the 
office was in chaos, there were a lot of students standing around, teachers 
standing around.  When I came in the secretary told her I had been waiting, she 
introduced herself and she was very puzzled about me being there, had no clue 
who I was, she literally said you’re hired without having ever met me, seen my 
resume, nothing, she just said you’re hired.  I was very concerned, I guess, for her 
as a young black woman in the role that she held, and I felt a great need to help 
her coming right in, I didn’t know exactly what I was going to do, but I knew I 
wanted to support her because my initial meeting with her was a very poor 
meeting, and I could just see the stress on her, and I intended to be a support to 
her because the staff that were around her on that first meeting I had clearly were 
not supportive.  
 
We Had Just “Gotten” It 
 Despite the initial challenges, each participant was able to confidently declare that 
they made growth in student test scores while attempting to turn their schools around.  
This was something they all spoke about, some more passionately than others, as they 
recalled the experience in their interviews.  This feeling of success, however short-lived, 
was a defining moment for many of them that confirmed they were being effective 
leaders.  Courtney described it this way,  
 
We had teachers having student-led parent conferences, the kids were there and 
showing their parents what they had grown in and what they had learned, you talk 
about powerful, amazing, so I attribute that to that last year I was there, 19 points 
in percentage growth.  It’s unheard of, 19 percentage points, I mean we were just, 
we were rocking it.  They were just, the kids were finally feeling like they were 
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going to school, they were finally feeling like they belonged somewhere, and I 
had the right teachers in the right spots. 
 
 Although Stephanie’s growth was not exponential, she describes the renewed 
confidence it gave her staff to know that they were able to achieve some success with the 
students.  Stephanie talked, quite unenthusiastically, about her gains by saying,  
 
I want to say it was my either my first or second year, we met expected growth, 
and that’s something that hadn’t been done in some years, so we met expected 
growth.  The teachers felt really good after meeting expected growth.  
 
 Samuel spoke of his growth defiantly when describing how his student 
performance and graduation rates increased in spite of the obstacles from within the 
building as well as from the central office.  His recollection of his success in student 
achievement was described in this way, 
 
The last four years, we had made major improvement, we had seen major growth.  
The year before they had a 40% English rate and a 40% math rate.  The first year 
I was there, we raised the English rate to 60% and we raised the math rate to 60%, 
so we were proud of those accomplishments but that still gave us a grade of a D.  
Then the following year our graduation rate went up.  We raised the graduation 
rate from 60 to 68% which is phenomenal in a urban school.  This last year the 
graduation rate went well over 80%, but we were still released on performance, 
which was sad because we had really turned the school around and we were 
beginning to see improvement in all areas, and all of our interventions were 
working, and we had the data to show that our interventions were working. 
 
 When Melinda spoke of her growth, she had this to say, 
 
By the third year I was there we had turned around close to 20 percentage points, 
we were in the 40s, focused real hard on just instruction, alignment, rigor, and 
engagement, nothing else, good hiring practices.  That next school year I was a 
finalist in the Piedmont Central Principal of the Year and the final five went to 
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Raleigh from the work that we had done, and we had put a lot of hours.  My final 
score was 58.6.  From 23, and you know, it was a journey, it was a new principal 
placed there, politics, a lot of hate and doubt, turnaround, new building, staff was 
excited to be there, lowest turnover ever the summer before I moved out, so we 
had just gotten it. 
 
Fighting Against the System 
Driving the turnaround movement is the public and legislative outcry for rapid 
improvements in test scores.  As the practice of using standardized tests as the only 
measure to determine student learning increases, it also determines the success or failure 
of a school principal.  The stories of these scapegoat principals indicate that there are 
moving pieces of this turnaround scenario that have a direct effect on student 
achievement.  Yet, growth in student end of the year assessments and high school 
graduation rates is still expected, placing the principal in between the proverbial, “rock 
and a hard place.”  To show improvements while trying to overhaul other critical aspects 
of the school program with little to no support exposes an acute flaw in the turnaround 
model used to replace principals in these low performing schools.   
 In some interviews, I found that the participants’ personal recollections of growth 
did not always agree with the actual numerical data.  While advocates of turnaround 
reform may use this as ammunition to support their movement, I believe this observation 
presents something more valuable than simple data to justify principal replacement.  This 
difference draws attention to those “intangibles” of turnaround that may be occurring in 
the schools that is not reflected in numerical indicators.  All four participants, 
notwithstanding, had data to support that student proficiency improved.  Their data are 
evidence that these principals and their staff were poised to continue the upward 
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trajectory towards attaining even more improvements and meeting federal and state 
proficiency standards.  If the data supports positive outcomes for students in a turnaround 
school under the leadership of these individuals, the obvious assumption is that the 
principal was effective in some way.  But time, not results, played a role in their 
derailment.  
 In addition to the research supporting the fact that it takes three to five years to 
turn around low performing schools, Tirozzi (2013) says that “the importance of adequate 
time and the need for continuity of staff and programs apparently have been lost on 
federal officials, who continue to insist that a principal must be replaced if he or she has 
been in a failing school for at least two years” (p. 187).  All of the participants shared the 
same sentiments about their student growth and the pressures of meeting the timelines 
outlined in federal, state and local reform sanctions for their schools.   
 Mandating research based programs and strategies while at the same time 
ignoring the research on the time it takes to turnaround a failing school creates a complex 
duality for the principals in this study.  The very model created to promote reforms was 
undermining the confidence that these principals and their staff had worked so hard to 
instill in their students.  To be evaluated on how long it took to effect change rather than 
how much had changed is a deficit model that each of the scapegoat principals felt was a 
huge barrier to not just student achievement, but their own success as school leaders.  
 When Melinda spoke of the time constraints in her interview she highlighted this 
point, “you can’t put 100% poverty in one building and expect it to work in five years.”  
Stephanie also spoke of the limited time she had to turn around her school: 
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You see incremental successes and when we would see a success, the district will 
come in and change something.  It was just really hard because you’re fighting 
against the system.  I have to work my behind off ten times as much being in this 
Title I school, I can’t get the credit due me, and then when the test scores don’t go 
up as quickly as you need them to, I’m then put, I’ve been replaced. 
 
 Courtney’s experience parroted these same frustrations that other participants felt 
when discussing the time stipulations for raising test scores at her school: “It was already 
at the bottom when I got there and I helped it get up a little bit, but not in four years you 
can’t solve the world’s issues, you can’t.” 
 Samuel spoke of his vexation with the amount of time he was given in similar 
terms as the others,  
 
No Child Left Behind statute said that three years in a row, if a school receives a 
D or F they can be removed, and so what the school district did was they looked 
at that, they didn’t look at the growth, they didn’t look at the data, you know, 
where we had grown, they simply said that, you know, we were low performing.  
Change theorists will tell you that when you go into these schools that are just 
downtrodden and have not been properly run for so many years, it takes five to 
seven years to turn them around.  Well, with the No Child Left Behind waiver that 
the state received, we, you know, we don’t have that opportunity, you know, I had 
three years, and that wasn’t enough time. 
 
Rocks and Pebbles 
There was consensus among the group interviewed that these time restraints were 
not only an unfair measurement of their students’ success, but also an unjust evaluation 
of their effectiveness as school administrators.  Although this is not included as a major 
theme, there was enough mention of this in their interviews that it warrants inclusion in 
this study.  Three out of four of the principals spoke of the standards used to determine 
leadership effectiveness and/or promotion between those in Title I and non-Title I 
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schools.  In their words, the customary use of test data as the sole indicator of success is 
unjust.  For example, when speaking of this difference, Melinda spoke of some obvious 
gaps that exist between the two groups, 
 
I’d love to see a non-Title I principal come over to a Title I school and try to make 
it.  They wouldn’t, they wouldn’t make it, it takes a special person, you know that.  
You can’t do it you know what I’m saying.  There’s no way the principal I 
worked with at a school in this district, with 90% Caucasian, 100% two-parent 
families, college educated families, PTA, I think they had close to $100,000 in 
PTA budget, community school, well-established, no teacher has left there in 18 
years, 18 years, like no wonder y’all all know each other, like so what do y’all do, 
they stand and deliver and sit and get. 
 
 Samuel offered a striking analogy to compare the two scenarios.  Although it is 
lengthy, I felt that it completely summed up the experiences of principals who are trying 
to save low performing schools.  He explained it in this way, 
 
Well you got big rocks, you got medium-sized rocks, and you got little rocks.  
You can’t see those medium-sized rocks and them little rocks, because you’ve got 
to address those big rocks.  Once you address those big rocks, which may take 
you however long it takes, then you address those medium-sized rocks, and then 
you address the pebbles.  Some people go into schools and all they have are 
pebbles.  And they’re immediately allotted and acclaimed as being, you know, 
super educators.  Others people go into schools as administrators and they have 
medium-sized rocks.  So their change is within that scope.  But then other 
administrators who are unjustly in my opinion placed, and not give them the time 
nor the resources, they go into schools that have been undermanaged, they have a 
huge amount of big rocks, with no support, no resources, no parental involvement, 
teacher apathy, student apathy, these are the huge rocks, and they are given three 
years.  They ain’t got big rocks, they got boulders, you know what I’m saying?  
And they give you three years and you’re done.  So all my hard work, now the 
person that replaced me, they’re dealing with the small, medium rocks and the 
pebbles.  Because I’ve taken care of the boulders and the big rocks. 
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 Stephanie spoke of this glaring discrepancy in like terms:  
 
What I think is unfair about Title I—and I’ve thought about this often, here I was 
in this high-risk Title I school and some of these folks had been in these non-Title 
I schools and they’ve moved up quickly.  Look at the schools where they were.  
When you think about me over here at a Title I school, high risk, and you’re over 
here at Fluff Fluff school, of course you’re going to be able to move up quickly 
because you’re going to see success much faster.  Does that mean that the work 
you’re doing or you’re capable of doing is better than the work I’m capable of 
doing, or how are you measuring the success of me versus you?  That’s where I 
have a problem.  
 
She continued to share her frustration with this unfair system of defining 
principal merit in this way: 
 
I’m mad at the fact that you put people in these positions and you don’t see the 
worth of their work, you base it on the wrong thing, and someone comes on the 
heels of my hard work, they then reap the fruits of my labor, and then they’re put 
on this pedestal like they did the work and they didn’t, you have somebody over 
here who’s never stepped foot in Title I school, the school will run if they were 
never sitting in the principal’s office, and because the school would run if they 
never were in the principal’s office, they get promoted and promoted and 
promoted because they’ve always been in these cushy schools.  So who’s really 
the successful person of who is being deemed as doing the work, the better work? 
 
This also raises questions about the leaders who replace these scapegoat 
principals.  As Samuel suggests, often the hard tasks are already conquered before the 
new principal comes in.  As a result, they capitalize on the momentum that has been 
established prior to their arrival, which includes receiving credit for improved test scores.  
Furthermore, these principals often come into these high needs schools with more 
support, funding and resources because of the pressure the district is under to get these 
schools off “the list” of failing schools.  In each scenario, these new administrators and 
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their schools flourish temporarily, painting a picture of success for the public that the 
turnaround model was effective.  However, what is not publicized is the tenure of the 
new principal in these schools after the resources are exhausted.  In all but one case in 
this study, none of the principals who followed the participants are still working in the 
schools but have since matriculated on to other schools within the district or have left the 
district altogether.   
This confirms research conducted by The Center on Education Policy (McMurrer, 
2012) which says, “although a SIG award brings substantial extra funding for school 
reform, it does not guarantee that districts and schools can find principals and teachers 
with the necessary expertise who are willing to work in the lowest performing schools” 
(p. 1).  This speaks directly to the issue of the qualifications needed to lead in these 
environments and if replacing the principals willing to serve in them, despite the 
challenges, is indeed a practice that should continue in school reform models.  
Going Down with the Ship: 
Principal Commitment in the Face of Replacement 
 
After finally reaching a point where they felt hopeful about the progress they were 
able to see happening in their schools, each principal was replaced for being a failure.  It 
may seem like a simple process; however, the reality is that there was a cycle of politics 
and injustice in their replacement that emerged from the interviews.  This section of the 
study is dedicated to exploring their experiences as they were forced to continue leading 
with the daily imminent reality of replacement. 
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Faith over Failure 
In each of the scapegoat principals’ narratives, they all spoke of the hope or faith 
they maintained throughout their struggle to improve test scores.  As they began to see 
their work eventually evolve into a learning environment where achievement was 
possible, they became more optimistic about the future of the school.  Although they 
acknowledged at different places in the interviews that they had “some” knowledge of the 
grave responsibility and consequences attached to the job of the turnaround principal, 
when they received the news of replacement they all exhibited feelings of unbelief or 
shock that they would actually be replaced.  
This disbelief was grounded in the fact that every participant felt as though the 
positive outcomes at their schools should have given them some leverage against the 
mandated sanctions that would be carried out against them.  Each of the principals wore 
their accomplishments like a badge of honor somehow believing that their small 
successes would lead to a different end.  Samuel, who defiantly stood on the growth and 
graduation rates at Augusta High, insisted that increased performance should have been 
enough to keep his position since it proved that he had been effective at leading the 
school.  
 
Our algebra in our freshman center, the kids were passing at 85%.  Last year my 
freshman students were passing at 85%.  My graduation rate went from 60 to 68% 
and this year it will be over 80%.  So how would you give me low performance, 
or poor performance, how would you take my administrative contract away from 
me and say poor performance?  It makes me feel that it’s not about your passion, 
it’s not about your expertise, it’s not about your level of expertise, it’s all 
political.  
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 Not only did Samuel express his feelings of disappointment at being replaced 
after showing improvement, but his dissatisfaction over his replacement was further 
exacerbated by the inequitable distribution of sanctions between black and white 
administrators in his district. 
 
So this white guy gets a letter, of poor performance because the state said, you 
know, his middle school had three F’s.  This black lady, her high school was an 
A, but her middle school was an F, she gets a letter of poor performance, okay, 
and all of her administrative team, right?  Even though we were going up 1.2, 1.5, 
1.85, we get a letter, all of us get letters, because, you know, we had a D.  So they 
called this white man back and gave him a principalship.  They call my white 
assistant principal back to his same position, they didn’t call my black assistant 
principals back, they didn’t call me back.  
 
The impact on Stephanie that she would be replaced was much more 
emotional than most of the other participants.  For her, the news came as a surprise 
because her news came so suddenly.  Like Samuel, however, she too felt like she was 
working hard to make improvements that should be honored with more dignity than what 
she received.   
 
Devastated.  It made me—I was devastated, because I felt like I was working as 
hard as I could with what I had, I wasn’t given a fair shake.  I couldn’t, I just 
could not, I couldn’t believe it, it took me, it literally, it took the wind out of me, 
just—it shook me.  I couldn’t believe it.  It literally devastated, it devastated me.  
It devastated me. 
 
According to Brown (2005), “. . . the majority of African American leaders are 
employed in large, urban school districts that are underfunded, have scarce resources, 
significant numbers of uncertified teachers, and student underachievement” (p. 587).  
This means that principals like Samuel and Stephanie are more likely to lose their 
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positions than their white colleagues because of federal, state, or local sanctions that 
continue to insist upon replacing principals as a part of the solution to improving low 
performing schools.  What Samuel says, however, sheds light on a hidden truth that was 
revealed in his interview.  He gave clear evidence that in some instances, even when 
placed in low performing schools under the same mandates, white principals and assistant 
principals are less likely to lose their positions than African American administrators.   
This is problematic because “currently, the placement of African American 
principals implicitly indicates that African Americans can only lead and be effective in 
schools that are predominately Black, and White administrators are able to lead in 
schools that are more diverse” (p. 248).  Furthermore, these actions on the part of district 
officials create a perception that the decision to replace or end the careers of principals in 
turnaround schools rests on other factors such as race and micro-political influences that 
ultimately create division between African American and White administrators.  This 
internal separation raises concern about whether or not “the placement of African 
American administrators centers around whether any lingering effects or assumptions 
with regard to racial segregation 50 years after the Brown decision have any impact on 
the placement of African American principals” (p. 248).  Ultimately, all these practices 
succeed at is perpetuating existing feelings of racism and discrimination among African 
Americans in general and sends a message that the careers of White principals are valued 
over those of African American principals (McCray, Wright, & Beachum, 2007). 
Stephanie’s devastation at being moved from her position proves how vested 
these principals become in the work of school improvement.  For her, the blow of losing 
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her job after giving so much of herself to the students, teachers and families elicited a 
strong personal and emotional response.  In their interviews, she and Samuel both relived 
this part of their experience with passion and feelings of hurt and anger.  For them, the 
impact of being told they would be replaced was more cutting because of the personal 
sense of responsibility they felt towards the students being principals of color themselves, 
and leading in predominantly minority schools.   
As an African American principal, I too, understand this sense of obligation to 
children of color.  It is our own experiences of discrimination that often compel us to take 
up the cross of equality to erase the sin of racism and marginalization for this population 
of students.  However, because African American principals are more likely to lead in 
schools that are in decline, there must be a shift in the way we navigate these turbulent 
waters of school reform if we are going to live to lead another day.  As much as we want 
to take on this task, Wilkerson (2014) posits, and I would agree, that 
 
African American principals (especially African American male principals) find 
themselves in a very precarious position.  Many are so dedicated to their mission 
(fulfilling the idea that “I want to work with a certain population”) of serving 
those less fortunate that they may fail to see their own peril coming around the 
corner. (pp. 19–20) 
  
During the time Melinda was undergoing turnaround, she was not only leading growth in 
student achievement, but her school had received state and national recognition for the 
improvements made during her tenure.  Melinda had also been named Principal of the 
Year in her region.  These credentials normally translate into job security and promotion 
for school administrators, however, like the others, her professional pedigree was useless 
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in protecting her from replacement.  In her interview, it was clear that she felt as though 
she was worthy of reward rather than penalty: 
 
All the things that we had gotten right, all the things we had gotten right I felt like 
were just thrown in the trash, that’s how you feel, you know, all that work.  In-
depth strategic planning over years, and then North Carolina signed Race to the 
Top and it was all over, it was just quickly over. 
 
Like Stephanie, Melinda shared the same feelings of being blindsided 
by the news of replacement and spoke passionately about her frustration at being left out 
of the loop on just how close she was to being replaced.  
 
But no time, at any time did I realize that the axe was getting ready to chop my 
head off.  I had no warning, none.  I had no idea.  No one told me, no one sat me 
down and said you are one of the lowest schools in North Carolina, and we know 
you’ve come from 20 to 50, if you don’t hit 60 this year you’re gonna have to be 
replaced, no one said that to me.  
 
Replacing Melinda’s leadership in light of this kind of success completely 
devalues the work of the turnaround principal and caters to sanctions that make it 
virtually impossible for principals to be successful.  While she was bringing positive 
publicity to the school district with these accomplishments, she was receiving the 
negative impacts of being replaced.  Her work meant nothing in the face of No Child Left 
Behind policies and mandates.  This no tolerance way of leading school change dismisses 
the laborious job that principals perform each day to improve student outcomes in low 
performing schools.  Furthermore, it fans the flames of cynicism created by some to 
create a public impression that schools and educators are failing and need to be replaced.  
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 Courtney, who agreed to sacrifice herself for the much-needed SIG funds, could 
not conceal her sadness when the requirement that she would be replaced actually 
manifested.   
 
I was seeing all this hard work that I had done basically being said we don’t care 
how good it looks, you’re still the scapegoat.  I feel like I—I mean this sounds 
cocky but I feel like I’m good at what I do and I want to continue doing it, and I 
don’t think I’d be happy doing something else.  We are the one sole, responsible 
person, so yes, it is my responsibility, it was my responsibility, but the end results 
were positive, the end results of that, of my tenure at that school was positive, but 
nobody sees that.  They see that I was part of that turnaround and I got kicked out. 
 
 Interestingly enough, Courtney also admits her change of heart when the action to 
replace her was set in motion, 
 
If I could go back and change one thing I would have gone to bat for keeping me 
there, keeping my staff, I would have voted for more of a transformational model, 
even, I know it still says principal goes but I would have gone to bat for it. 
 
The fact should not be overlooked all of their schools were able to show growth without 
the SIG funds.  This is a key component of the turnaround movement that is overlooked 
in current policies that call for the removal of the principal and staff at low performing 
schools.  Without millions of dollars funneled into the school, and little to no support 
from their supervisors or superintendents, they were able to show improvements in 
student test scores, build community, redesign the culture of the school and create a staff 
that was sold out to the politics of school reform.  It was the dedication, not the dollars 
that changed the conditions of these schools, thus proving that the turnaround model is 
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flawed at best in its assessment of why schools are failing and the remedies for 
improvement. 
Close Up Shop and Move On 
 The next piece of this cycle involves the methods used by districts to announce 
the replacement of these principals and their career options afterwards.  These practices 
ranged from highly publicized and sensationalized attention in the media to quiet 
removals that went virtually unnoticed by anyone at all.  In some instances, such as in 
Stephanie’s case, the removal was positioned as a promotion.  As Stephanie describes it,  
 
She (supervisor) came over one day, told me I was being replaced by someone 
else and I had a choice of becoming an assistant principal again or I could become 
an SSA downtown, so of course I’m thinking I’ve done nothing to become an 
assistant principal again, why would I choose that, I’ll become an SSA downtown 
to serve as an administrator, very awkward position, because then I would become 
an SSA under her.   
 
 Stephanie’s replacement was shrouded in political chess moves to ensure there 
would be no public outcry for moving yet another principal from the school.  Unlike the 
others, she was coached on how to present the move to her staff even though she had 
clearly been told that she was being replaced because the school was still low performing. 
 
They presented it to the staff as I was given a district level position.  The way that 
meeting happened and then the way they presented it to the staff was totally 
different.  We want you to tell the staff you’re being given a district level 
position, that’s how we want you to present it to the staff, because they know that 
parents and staff members would then have a total fit for you to say to them that 
you’re having me replaced.  It would have been a political issue that they didn’t 
want to deal with.  Then once they brought him there, [the new principal], then 
they said oh, we’re restructuring the school. 
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Despite efforts to protect her dignity publicly, Courtney still had to grapple 
privately with the idea of working for the very person who assisted with her replacement.  
So although it appeared she was being “promoted” she was actually being set up to work 
under the same supervisor that was so hostile towards her while she was a principal.  This 
was an interesting move on the part of the district because it would appear that Stephanie 
was again, as she said in her interview, being set up for failure.   
 
How you gonna bring me behind closed doors and give me the options you gave 
me, and you sitting right in front of me lying, I mean just looking me dead in my 
face.  And then turn around and have to go to work for the very person who did it 
to me, in her office because then she became a regional superintendent and I 
became her SSA, I was like, I was like what, really?  
 
 In his interview, Samuel repeatedly professed how unfairly he was treated and the 
district obstacles placed in his way while trying to improve his school.  Believing this 
replacement was more of a conspiracy orchestrated by the superintendent than mandated 
sanctions, he seemed to accept his replacement as the natural order of his situation.  He 
was prepared for his replacement but did not intend to leave quietly.  Having no offer of a 
new position, Samuel was bluntly informed that his contract would not be renewed while 
others in his same situation were receiving offers of principalships, assistant principal 
placements, and even teaching positions.  Understanding that his career options in the 
district had ended, Samuel took a very different path than the others.  
 
But you gave this white man a job, as a principal, he’s a principal now.  And you 
give my white assistant principal a job at the same school.  Oh, they gave her 
(black principal) a job at half her salary, a teaching job.  Now mind you she’s in 
her 40s and has a family, didn’t bother me because I retired.  I was, you know, I 
was able to retire, full retirement, and plus I, you know, was financially frugal 
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with my, you know, so and the insurance piece didn’t bother me because my wife 
is an administrator in township and we had free health insurance, so I’m, you 
know, I’m fine, but you see why I’m bitter to a certain extent, because it wasn’t 
about kids, you see, it was—it’s politics. 
 
While there was no public media attention given to the announcement of his 
replacement, his own hurt and disgruntlement about his replacement caused him to defy 
the central office actions against him.  Believing that his replacement was more of a 
method to remove him because of a previous Office of Civil Rights claim he made 
against the district, this is how he reacted to his replacement, 
 
So you know what I did, I filed a retaliation lawsuit against them.  They messed 
with the wrong one.  Because see, I have no fear.  Because I believe in a just God, 
and I know that He orders my steps, and I know that as long as I’m doing the right 
thing, there’s nothing anybody can do to me.  I’ve had challenges, I’ve had 
struggles all my life as a black man.  This just one more.  And win, lose, or draw 
at the end of the day, nothing beats a failure but a try.  And I know what my rights 
are. 
 
 Melinda’s replacement followed the pattern of notification that was similar to 
Stephanie’s.  She, like Stephanie, received little preparation for the announcement and 
was told of her fate in the middle of testing season, which is a high stress time for 
principals everywhere. 
 
Our CO really didn’t warn us much.  Three of them come over one day… and 
said we need to talk to you, you know North Carolina signed Race to the Top, I 
said I read that, and they said I don’t know if you have the grant or not and I said 
no, I haven’t read it, no, we’re busy, it’s end of grade testing, they said Melinda 
you’re gonna have to move, I said what have I done, they said well y’all didn’t hit 
60%.  Okay, I just said, I said okay. 
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Melinda’s reaction to her replacement was filled more with frustration at not 
being informed about the process more than the actual act of losing her job, and this is 
what she spoke about very passionately in her interview. 
 
But no time, at any time did I realize that the axe was getting ready to chop my 
head off.  I had no warning, none.  I had no idea.  No one told me, no one sat me 
down and said you are one of the lowest schools in North Carolina, and we know 
you’ve come from 20 to 50, if you don’t hit 60 this year you’re gonna have to be 
replaced, no one said that to me.  Now they signed it, they came and told me, and 
then they said you know you can’t stay, we’re not sure what we’re gonna do yet. 
 
Later, after being notified, Melinda recounts the humiliation she suffered 
when the announcement of her replacement was made in a full principal’s meeting 
without her knowledge. 
 
I’ll never forget the principal’s meeting that they announced the new principal and 
I was in the room in front of every principal in the district and every director, like 
could we not have sent me on an errand or something, could we not have sent me 
to a workshop, it’s just, that just is crazy.  They applauded the new principal.  She 
sat down and then they had me stand up and applauded me, and the meeting was 
over.  No principal wants to go through that, nobody wants to do that.  Who 
would ask for that, right, who would ever want to go through that and they didn’t, 
you could tell on their faces that they were like nah, better you than me, I’m 
staying low. 
 
Melinda’s treatment by the district was the outlier in the group of scapegoat 
principals because her superintendent actually encouraged her efforts and assured her that 
she was not the problem at the school.  
 
The superintendent called, DPI, state, everybody he could and said look, you 
know, we got something going here, any way y’all could do a waiver, an 
extension, you know, send in another principal, have two principals, let her stay 
and put in another one?  Nope, the law says five years and under 60% and then I 
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told you we were at 58.8, 58.9, whatever, we were like two points away from 60, 
so he came over one day and he said this is inevitable, this, it’s nothing you did, 
and it’s nothing the school did, it’s just, I can’t change this, it just is what it is.  He 
said so close up shop and let’s just move on. 
 
We see here that at least one district official felt the need to salvage some of the 
momentum that had been in motion at a failing school.  His willingness to ask for an 
exception on behalf of this school and Melinda expresses his own views that seem to 
contradict what the law surrounding turnaround sanctions should be.  He not only asked 
for the stay, but recognized that there were multiple strategies that could be used, other 
than principal and staff replacement, that would serve this school better.  The courage to 
question the process shows signs that superintendents, and others in charge of carrying 
out these radical reform initiatives, also have concerns about disrupting the organization 
of a failing school that shows signs of revitalization.   
Alternatives like these mirror the requests of school districts around the country 
who are facing challenges replacing principals and staff affected by turnaround policies.  
For example, 
 
the Michigan Department of Public Instruction requested that the principal of a 
school that received a SIG grant could remain in place in some situations for 
example, if the principal had been hired within the last two years but was not 
brought in specifically for reform purposes or the principal had been hired more 
than two years ago but there is evidence that student achievement is improving. 
(McMurrer, 2012, p. 17) 
 
Unfortunately, their request for this waiver was denied by the U.S. Department of 
Education.  At the local level, what is more telling about these kinds of appeals is that in 
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the face of turnaround policies, superintendents, like principals, are feeling powerless 
against the sanctions as well. 
 Melinda was presented with an option for employment after being replaced.  
However, the option she was given was cloaked in efforts to keep her out of sight until 
the winds of replacement subsided.  She explained it this way, 
 
So he came in (new superintendent) and said I’m not quite sure what to do with 
you.  He said but you can’t stay here.  So he came up the next day, I’m gonna 
make you a director.  I said okay, I said over at CO?  He said yeah, like is that my 
only choice, because I’m not sure I want to be a director.  And he said yeah, that’s 
your choice, he said you’ve got to hide out for a while like I did when I was 
dropped out of my old county, you have to hide, well I didn’t have a choice, so I 
was placed over at CO and given the Race to the Top grant to manage.  This is not 
a lie.  Director of Federal Programs.  
 
Despite failing to turn her school around, she was seemingly compensated, 
like Stephanie, with a district level position.  These “promotions” that both Melinda and 
Stephanie received proved to be strategies staged by district officials to avoid public 
fallout, to have the scapegoat principal “disappear” from the public eye while they 
appointed new principals in their stead.  Executive decisions made by superintendents to 
place these principals in district level positions after they failed at building level jobs 
contradicts the argument that they are ineffective.   
You’re the Scapegoat 
For Courtney, this part of the cycle played out in the public eye so frequently that 
she became the face of failure in the district.  Poor media management by the district 
gave legitimacy to the practice of replacing principals “like her” and she single-handedly 
became the source of the problems at Old Forest Elementary.  As she described it,  
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The publicity made it a negative as if I was the reason that the school was so bad.  
The public impression at the time was that I was the cause of why it was such a 
bad school and why it became a failing school.  I have had people literally, for 
example, I had a disgruntled staff member this year and she wrote a letter to the 
school board and in the letter it said she’s going to do to our school what she did 
to Old Forest and I’m like you seriously think that me, that one person caused that 
school to go that deep in one action or in one fell swoop? 
 
Hidden beneath the public announcement of Courtney’s replacement was how 
she was privately being treated by the central office.  As she describes it, this was the 
most difficult part of the process. 
 
The roughest part for me that I had to keep away from my staff was what was 
happening to me as a principal and how they were basically saying I would never 
be in elementary school again.  Basically being said we don’t care how good it 
looks, you’re still the scapegoat, even though that’s not the wording they said, 
having the conversations with the regional superintendent and the superintendent 
of basically telling me that I’m the figurehead that’s gonna be taking the rolls with 
the punches, you know, that really beat me up. 
 
Future career options for Courtney were not as promising as they were for the 
other scapegoat principals.  Although she was offered a demotion as an assistant 
principal, after several failed attempts on her part to get the district to confirm the offer in 
writing, she had no choice but to seek employment elsewhere. 
 
I was offered a position within the district as an assistant principal at a school 
where they knew the principal was leaving after Christmas because they were 
retiring, and I’d been told that then I would be the principal after that, but they 
wouldn’t put it in writing, and I said I’m not gonna go to a school and be an AP 
and then at Christmastime decide to put somebody else as the principal, I want it 
in writing.  They wouldn’t put it in writing.  Because at that point they said we’re 
not gonna put you in an elementary school because it wouldn’t look good in the 
press, the parents wouldn’t accept you.   
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In her desperation, Courtney tried to use her ties with other administrators and 
supervisors within the district to appeal for any positions she could get based on her 
experience. 
 
I’d actually gone to some other people in the county that are regional 
superintendents and even tried to get them to say, you know, can I be a principal 
in your zone, in your region, and feeling that black ball of nobody wants you, and 
I’m like what have I done so bad to everybody besides what the news says and, 
you know what I mean, it just—I felt like nobody gave me a chance. 
 
After interviewing her colleague, I discovered that Courtney was relying solely on 
this offer of becoming an assistant principal and would not look elsewhere for positions.  
Even after admitting poor treatment by her superiors, she was placing her faith in their 
promise of a job.  Her staff was not convinced that the district had honest intentions after 
witnessing the foul tactics used against her while she was leading the school.  Fearing for 
her career, it was her colleagues who prompted her to pursue other options.  One of her 
close colleagues describes a kind of intervention a group of teachers held with Courtney 
to force her face her destiny within the district. 
 
She just kept thinking things were gonna be fine, and we kept telling her they’re 
not fine because we could all see it but she wanted it to work so badly and wanted 
it to succeed that she, she couldn’t, and finally one day we said if you don’t apply 
to other places you’re not going to have a job.  And she sat and she cried, you 
know.  We were just really happy when she got something, because we thought 
she deserved it. 
 
Finally, after accepting the painful fact that she had indeed been “blackballed” 
within the district and abandoned by the superintendent and his cabinet, she began to 
pursue other options outside the district.  This search was the point when Courtney began 
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to realize the far-reaching impact of the fate of principals who are replaced in low 
performing schools. 
 
I went for an interview in another district and I was told by the superintendent on 
the phone afterwards that they didn’t, that the board just did not want to bring in 
that type of attention, so it definitely affected me professionally.  I knew I had no 
chance, nobody was gonna give me a chance in that district.  Nobody would give 
me a chance in any of the neighboring districts, and the only reason why I got a 
second chance in my current district is because I had been a teacher there and I 
knew people in that district, and I had them going to bat for me. 
 
Samuel was the only participant to demonstrate any protest after being 
dismissed while the women in the study quietly left their schools without resistance.  As 
he made an argument for why he should have been allowed to stay, the women accepted 
their replacements and began to look towards their future to secure yet another 
administrative position. 
Survivor Island: Life After Turnaround 
 Once the process of replacing the scapegoat principals in this study completed its 
course, they all had to confront their future as educators and leaders.  Some, unable to get 
work in their districts after turnaround and some seemingly had favor and carried on at 
the district level.  But that’s not how their stories end.  Stephanie’s new appointment was 
short lived, as the effects of being a turnaround principal began to take affect once she 
was removed.   
 
I did my job at the central office until I got sick.  I didn’t realize that my body had 
internalized the stress of that whole episode to the fact to where it made me sick.  
And I believe that that’s the toll it took.  That’s how sick I had gotten.  The point 
of six months out of work, my parents had to come leave their home and come 
and take care of me.  Never had dealt with any of these ailments, migraines, none 
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of it, never until that day that I woke up, did not know where I was, who I was.  
Lost my short-term memory.  After all these neurologists, after all these testing, 
that’s what it boiled down to was stress.  Stress.  My body had internalized it to a 
point of almost death.  Hospitalized three times in two months.  Passing out.  And 
to this day, that is what it’s kind of boiled down to, and I’m still on medication for 
the headaches.  
 
Ironically, Stephanie’s career came full circle due to her illness and she, once 
again, serves as an assistant principal within her district.  When asked about the 
possibility of becoming a principal again, she surprisingly said, 
 
At this point in time I would.  I feel like I have the tools necessary to do so.  I feel 
like I’ve paid my dues also.  I feel like okay, there’s enough of high-needs schools 
for everybody.  If I don’t then who will?  Everybody isn’t made for the high-
needs school, everybody doesn’t have the heart for the type of child that you’re 
gonna find in a high-needs school. 
 
Of all the turnaround principals, Samuel’s replacement was the most recent.   
His hurt was still very fresh and at the time of our interview he was extremely bitter 
about how his career ended.  Believing that the superintendent and for profit 
organizations were collaborating to further widen the gap of segregation between schools 
within the district, rather than appeal the decision or seek a new principalship in another 
district, he vowed to seek justice through political activism in the community.  According 
to Samuel, those disenfranchised families who are victims of these corrupt strategies are 
not paying enough attention to what is happening and therefore their voices are not being 
heard.  It was his intent to become the voice of this population, the same population he 
had served as a turnaround principal. 
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So you have the most poorest of the poorest kids in the district, so they, the 80 to 
90% of the poor kids, they go here.  They live here.  But now what the community 
is trying to do is they’re trying to remove the kids and remove the families, 
because they want to bring the rich and the famous back into the inner city, and 
that’s why it’s called gentrification.  But black folks don’t see that, minority folks 
don’t see that, poor folks don’t see that. 
 
He pledged his allegiance to the cause of exposing these hidden tactics in this way, 
 
The war is not over.  I am going to make sure with every fiber of my being that 
people understand what’s going on.  I can do it by being a community activist, I 
can do it through going on television, radio, I can do it by starting grassroots 
campaigns, I can do it by participating in focus groups and speaking as not a 
person that hadn’t been in the field, because I’ve been there and I know that and 
you’re not going to tell me anything.  So I’m not done by any means. 
 
 Both these African American principals, despite their outcome, displayed an 
unrelenting dedication to continuing the struggle against failure for poor, minority 
students.  Their unwavering faith that there was still more for them to do as educators 
was unexpected considering the consequences they suffered at the hand of turnaround 
policies and district practices.  Stephanie spoke specifically to the candidate pool being 
limited and therefore she almost had no choice but to re-enter the position.  Samuel 
decided that the real battle needed to be fought on a different front to empower principals 
like Stephanie who feel called to these waning schools.  Their devotion to the children 
remained intact, no matter how their personal stories ended.  Rather than accept 
replacement as their fate, they both used the experience to prepare for round two of the 
fight against racial discrimination and educational disparities in our public school 
systems.  This reinforces the fact that social justice and the degree to which principals 
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adopt ideals of equity and inclusiveness are critical to school reform efforts in this 
country. 
Sometimes It Stings  
Courtney eventually found a position in the district where she began her teaching 
career.  Her reputation and relationship with those at the central office literally saved her 
professional career. 
 
Going through that year it definitely made me once again, push through, survive, 
and learn a lot about what I want to do in life, and it confirmed to me that I want 
to be in elementary, I want to help kids who are in poverty, I want to be doing 
those things.  I knew that getting a second chance in another county was the right 
direction and I will never go back to that district because the way I was treated. 
 
Coupled with this feeling of growth, she also shared a very optimistic view of 
her new district and how principals are treated as opposed to her former district. 
 
I also will never go (back) because the support of all of us in my new district is so 
amazing.  I can go to anybody and get help.  It’s not, I’m out . . . [there by] myself  
. . . I feel very supported in everything I do.  I don’t feel like there’s a microscope 
on top of me either, and I feel like there’s people there who want me to be 
successful, want our kids to be successful and that’s nice, it’s very nice, so I’ve 
been very happy and I’ve done well since, so I’m like okay, I think I’m doing—
still doing the right thing, so yeah.  
 
 After talking to Courtney’s colleague who followed Courtney to her new school, 
it is worth noting that her account of Courtney as a leader now is very different from the 
woman she worked with at Old Forest.  Courtney’s colleague described Courtney’s 
leadership this way, 
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She’s definitely more reserved, she holds back a little more because they made 
her be so micromanaged.  She is not a micromanager and again, compassionate, 
like ten people from school could call out and say they were sick and she would 
not question.  So I think she’s definitely softened up a little bit and I tell her that 
all the time.  I have said that to her, you need to go back to be the instructional 
leader you were, not that you’re not good, but this school is not where we were 
[i.e., Old Forest], and that has been hard for both of us. 
 
Her colleague attributed this “new” Courtney to her experience at Old Forest 
claiming that she could recognize how being replaced has affected her confidence. 
 
I think they made her feel like you don’t know what you’re doing, and so they 
tried to just manipulate everything she did, and she did know what she was doing.  
We have a particular teacher that should be gone by now, but she so much wants 
them to succeed, you know, she wants to give them every single chance that she 
can because she knew what it felt like to not be given a chance, you know, almost 
overcompensated a little bit, and I think sometimes she doesn’t realize the depth 
of necessity that the teachers need, they need a lot, and they won’t ask for it, and 
she’s like well how do I know, and this year she’s been a little more 
micromanaging.  
 
We see here the long ranging effects that the turnaround process has on 
principals like Courtney.  She remained confident that her calling was still with 
elementary students in low-performing schools, however the ways in which the 
experience has reshaped her leadership style are significant and appear to undermine her 
effectiveness in her new school, also low performing.  Present in her new way of leading 
is this need to prove herself to others.  Courtney spoke about this as well when she says, 
 
Sometimes it stings, you know it will go straight to the heart and make you 
emotional about it, but what I’ve learned is to basically, I just said, I just ignored 
it in some ways and I proved myself with my actions every day and I prove that 
I’m here for kids and what, my decision making is on the best interest of kids. 
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 Melinda’s outlook on leadership seemed unaffected by the turnaround process.  
Part of this is obviously because she had options after replacement.  She was placed in 
district office position but began to grow restless and long for the building level activity 
that she was accustomed to living.   
 
I self-selected to go back into a school.  And I was under contract so again, I had 
choices, so I made the choice and left.  I interviewed, talked to the school.  The 
superintendent has said it’s August, school’s started, we’ve got a principal that 
left, we need somebody really strong, its back in the same part of the city again.  
I’m on the 30th year, I’m doing what I love, I got three years left in my contract, 
I’m being paid at a district level, and I’m a curriculum facilitator, I’m happy, life 
is good people.  My supervisor said you really need to think about it, you know, 
the superintendent really wants somebody strong, it’s gonna be hard to find 
somebody strong, good school, we got an interim there, take your time. 
 
Melinda’s second principalship was markedly more collaborative and 
less coerced than the position she felt forced to accept at Tate Street Elementary.   
 
So I felt led, I thought about it, went in, I did interview with the staff, the PTA 
president, an assistant, you know, the whole interview, and so yeah, that’s 
different than being placed, when you’re wanted there and then people already 
knew me from being at Tate Street.  I got a warm reception and they were like 
these are the things we’ve heard you can do. 
 
The respect and series of options that Melinda was given after replacement 
rivaled that of the other participants in the study.  Her superintendent offered a dignified 
exit from her former position by promoting her.  Later she was able to use her contract as 
leverage to make certain demands and get a building level position as a curriculum 
facilitator at district level pay.  And finally, she was asked to take a position, given time 
to respond, and ultimately went into her next school as a shero in the district.  Her 
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professional career was unscathed by the ordeal and she made seamless transitions from 
one job to the other at will.  Nonetheless, she too spoke of the embarrassment of being 
singled out as a failure and having to contend with the stigma of replacement among her 
colleagues.   
 Amazingly, after being removed from her school, she was placed in a school 
similar to the one she had left.  To revisit my earlier analysis, this completely discredits 
the assumption that these principals are incompetent or they would not continue to be 
placed throughout the district or given the opportunity to lead in other low performing 
schools.  Moreover, I think that her experience serves as a model for other school districts 
on how to manage the turnaround fallout and treat replaced principals with human dignity 
and respect for the work they have given to the students, teachers and the district. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
 
Only the provident principal who can delay gratification in the cause of a future 
good will be able to carry the day though it often means taking a lot of criticism 
and pain. (McCall, 1986, p. 64) 
 
When I began my journey to becoming a school administrator I entered that world 
through the North Carolina Principal Fellows Program in 2001.  The first book that we 
were given to read was titled, The Provident Principal by John McCall.  The quote above 
from McCall resonated with me then and still does today.  It encompasses the spirit of 
this research and urges the principal on regardless of the cost. 
 Over time, principals learn to be the Provident Principal McCall speaks of, 
leading without emotion; wearing masks of confidence when we are broken inside; and 
learning that personal, emotional, and physical sacrifices are necessary and expected.  
The time we commit to the profession goes unnoticed by others and after a time, we 
convince ourselves that recognition is not necessary—it is our duty.  The position is both 
a blessing and curse.  As master’s students, we long for our chance to run the show.  It is 
the holy grail of education for many of us who aspire to do something great for children.  
What we overlook is that we were already doing something great long before we became 
principals. 
 Media coverage of self-made education icons like Steve Perry, Michelle Rhee, 
Ron Clark, and Geoffrey Canada make us believe we are not doing enough if we have not 
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achieved their level of fame.  The American public looks at them, then looks at the 
average school administrator and asks, “Why can’t you do that?” or, “What is your 
excuse?”  So we hold ourselves to these standards that, if scrutinized more thoroughly, 
are not transferrable to every situation, including the ones we often find ourselves in as 
principals in low performing schools.  Nevertheless, this pressure causes us to accept 
positions of leadership for which we know we are not prepared, somehow believing that 
their stories can become ours. 
 I began this research in order to answer some very important questions about 
principals in turnaround schools.  I’ve shared those in the previous chapter. 
1. What are the stories and experiences of principals and their colleagues who 
were placed in high needs school, and subsequently replaced? 
a.  What kind of special training and support do principals in high needs 
schools receive prior to entering into these environments? 
b.  How does the school district support principals in high needs schools? 
c.  To what extent do principals who are fired due to federal policies possess 
a social justice orientation? 
d. How should the experiences of principals replaced due to federal or local 
school reform models inform and impact education policy? 
Through their lives, as shared in the previous chapter, I was able to appropriately answer 
each of these questions.  I share below my lessons learned and recommendations 
springing from those lessons. 
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Lessons Learned: Recommendations for Principals, Districts, 
and Preparation Programs 
 
First of all, I discovered that the educational gifts bestowed upon all of us in this 
profession are not transferrable across all settings, and that training prior to becoming a 
turnaround principal is key to a principal’s success.  Samuel had served in administrative 
positions at the district level prior to his first appointment as a principal charged with 
turning around a failing school.  He was successful at his first school but failed at 
Augusta High.  Melinda and Courtney had served in high needs schools as teachers 
and/or assistant principals.  However, when appointed as principals to low performing 
schools, their previous skillset did not prove to be applicable.  Even Stephanie, who, 
although she did not have much experience before becoming a principal, did have some 
leadership experience—that did not seem transferable to helping her in her school.   
Does this mean that their past experiences could not help them with the 
turnaround school principalship?  These participants were not, in fact, less effective, but 
found themselves in environments that were different from their prior ones as much as 
they were similar.  We often make the mistake of assuming that all schools of color 
where students are impacted by poverty are basically “the same.”  However, every 
school, not just failing schools, is distinctive.  This distinctiveness, not their expertise, 
was the contributing factor in each of their situations.  Furthermore, some of them had 
worked at different grade levels during their educational careers.  The needs of 
elementary, middle and high school children and their communities are vastly different.  
While Courtney had to deal with gang-related violence at her elementary school, Melinda 
was battling the issue of transiency that affects the 95% participation requirement that all 
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schools have to pass during state testing.  Stephanie was breaking up fights among adults 
at her high school, while Samuel was addressing the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases among his population.  Inexperience coupled with lack of exposure to these 
kinds of environments is a recipe for failure.   
Therefore, when preparing principals to go into these environments, districts 
should understand their varying professional development needs prior to placing them in 
these failing schools.  Part of this strategy should include strategic leadership changes 
within districts rather than seemingly random movement.  For example, prior to placing 
principals like Stephanie in a high-needs, high profile high school to “keep it out of the 
news” it would have been wise to allow her some time in that school learning from the 
current leadership and observing the “lay of the land.”  As it stands now, there is very 
little time for observation, training, or reflection when principals enter these types of 
schools.  School district superintendents have even adopted a common practice of 
conducting “learning walks” their first 100 days in the office to observe and understand 
the challenges they may be facing.   
Duke, (2006), cites similar methods of preparation that are being used in the state 
of Virginia.  “The Virgina School Turnaround Specialist Program selects 10 experienced 
administrators who “already have demonstrated their ability to promote school 
improvement, like Samuel, and who receive a summer of advanced graduate training 
before they are sent to tackle a struggling school” (p.730).  Support and programs like 
this must be extended to new principals as well to prevent them from becoming the 
scapegoats of failed school reform initiatives. 
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Secondly, I learned that support must begin on day one of the principal’s entrance 
into a failing school.  Delaying the need for resources to support the principal in a low 
performing school is counterproductive and borders on sabotage.  As stated in earlier 
chapters this practice seemed to be common among all the principals no matter the 
district.  This places principals in a position where they are always reacting, or as one 
colleague of a principal put it, “putting out fires all the time.”  This delay in assistance 
suspends the instructional leadership that is needed, thus creating a wasted year in terms 
of student achievement.  Knowing that this hinders productivity, rather than discounting 
that the first year “clean up” exists, reform policy should allow an exemption for test 
scores the first year that the new principal arrives.  
Another policy amendment could include state accountability sanctions against 
districts that do not provide support every year that the new principal is working to 
improve student performance.  As it stands now, districts are given complete latitude and 
provide support at their discretion, while principals work feverishly against the clock of 
sanctions that could end their careers.  To make matters worse, superintendents are the 
ones making these questionable principal appointments and then when the principals fail, 
they superintendents then do the replacing as well—slinking untouched into the safe 
confines of their cushy offices.  This indicates one-sided accountability strategies 
between districts and leaders at the building level with no checks and balances for district 
officials who could be seen as adding to the failure of these schools and principals.  
Tirozzi (2013) weighs in strongly on this matter of accountability in his criticism of the 
federal government and their influence in how states educate their children.  He posits 
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that “The absurdity of such an elongated federal reach into the operation of local schools 
is compounded when it is considered that the ED does not have the staff, resources, or 
expertise to monitor the mandates is has imposed” (p. 203). 
 Yet another lesson I learned from these principals was that you cannot even begin 
to address the needs of students in low performing schools unless you possess a sense of 
social justice and are willing to fight for equitable conditions for them.  In this case, the 
race of the principals did not impede their ability to do this as all of their pasts had been 
shaped in ways to promote ideas of equity and fairness for everyone—especially for 
those who were disadvantaged.  Each of them was genuinely concerned about the well-
being of not just the students, but also of their families.  Much of their first-year 
experiences were characterized by building relationships with the families of their 
students to understand them and their needs.  In many cases these principals had to build 
bridges between the school and the world outside the school as the needs of their students 
transcended the walls of the school building.   
 In this present climate when political candidates in this country are allowed to use 
divisive rhetoric that targets those from marginalized communities and incites bigotry 
and racism, principals like the ones in my study are rare—black, white or Latino.  It is 
reckless for districts to create conditions that discourage socially conscious leaders who 
want to serve in high needs schools.  Theoharis (2007), in his work on social justice 
leadership, posits that “Marginalized students do not receive the education they deserve 
unless purposeful steps are taken to change schools on their behalf with both equity and 
justice consciously in mind” (p. 250).  Without leaders like the ones in my study, the 
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work of school turnaround is pointless.  As Marshall and Oliva posit, “policymakers and 
scholars talk about what can or should be done, but educational leaders are the people 
who must deliver some version of social justice and equity” (p. 1).  Therefore, it is 
imperative that district leaders begin to invest in these types of leaders, just as they invest 
millions into the schools they are charged with saving. 
 As schools become increasingly more diverse, university preparation programs 
should acknowledge the need for more opportunities for future school leaders to gain 
experiences in these settings.  The ultimate problem is that not even university professors 
can construct someone’s social justice consciousness.  This is a very personal part of 
someone’s personality that is embedded in their past experiences and has shaped who 
they are, and, ultimately, how they will lead.  From the research and the statements of the 
principals in this study, not everyone is willing to challenge their social justice 
consciousness by going to low performing schools.  
In the case of these principals, they all had some experience in low performing 
schools, or they were people of color, as in Stephanie’s case.  Superintendents cannot fall 
into the trap of only calling on those leaders who are already in low performing schools.  
Implications for these kinds of selection decisions create at least two problems in 
districts.  When the same group is always considered for the hardest jobs it leads to burn 
out among the talent pool which renders them ineffective.  At the same time, this limits 
their professional development because they never experience anything but difficult, high 
stakes situations that threaten their career.   
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Probably one of the most significant consequences of this over-use of principals 
in high needs schools is how it deters potential school leaders from entering the 
profession, thus limiting the candidate pool of qualified principals.  DiPaola and 
Tschannen-Moran (2003), as cited in Pijanowski et al. (2009) found that “Principals 
identified stress (91%) and time required at work (86%) as the top occupational 
deterrents for people who choose to opt out of school leadership after they meet the 
credential requirements” (p. 87). 
 Secondly, by not choosing leaders from status quo schools, districts can appear to 
reinforce discriminatory practices that protect the careers of principals in high performing 
schools and possibly these leaders’ lack of social justice consciousness.  Equitable 
distribution of principals throughout districts should be considered by all superintendents 
as a way to ensure that every principal is given the opportunity to lead in high needs, 
diverse schools. 
 These principals taught me that turnaround reform policies do not adequately 
serve the needs and interests of the subjugated populations who attend these low 
performing schools and that federal, state and local policy makers already know this.  In 
Spike Lee’s movie, “Jungle Fever,” Flipper, played by Wesley Snipes, decides to have an 
affair with Angie, an Italian co-worker played by Annabella Sciorra.  The two are invited 
to dinner at Flipper’s parents’ home played by Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee.  The father 
tells a very erotic, uncomfortable story at the dinner table of the contentious relationship 
between the slave master and his male slaves because of the master’s constant raping of 
his women at will.  He describes the covetous desires the slave develops towards the 
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white woman and how the slave covets the white woman in opposition to the master’s 
extracurricular outings to the slave quarters.  Flipper, outraged and Angie, thoroughly 
embarrassed, leave abruptly in response to the father’s history lesson.  After they leave, 
the mother says, “Why did you go and do that for?  You knew they were coming!”   
Just as Flipper’s father had intentionally invited the two so he could tell his story, 
policymakers know they are intentionally inviting principals all over the nation into 
situations where they already know the outcome.  The problem is that even though they 
know this, they are still allowing the principals to take all the blame for the school’s 
failure to improve.  Policymakers should consider how this dynamic not only lessens the 
attractiveness of the position of principal, but how it absolutely destroys and defeats good 
principals who could be successful.   
 Every one of the school’s in this study is still low performing after receiving more 
funding, new teachers, and new leadership.  Kozol (1991) describes this lack of real 
progress in this way, “In many cities, what is termed ‘restructuring’ struck me as very 
little more than moving around the same old furniture within the house of poverty.  The 
perceived objective was a more ‘efficient’ ghetto school . . .” (p. 4).  What would have 
happened if the scapegoat principals, some being right on the edge of the required 
proficiency rate, had been allowed to continue?  This reality should prompt federal, state 
and local education officials to reconsider this practice since the sustainability of school 
turnaround is questionable.  Instead of demanding change in an unrealistic amount of 
time and forcing principals and teachers out of their positions after seeing positive—but 
not sufficiently positive—results, this growth should become a part of the accountability 
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equation rather than the current all or nothing method of measuring effectiveness.  Until 
then, this constant disruption and changing of the guard translates into poor children of 
color being experiments of school reform and paying the ultimate price for circumstances 
over which they have no control.   
All of the participants in my study left with the scars of their experiences 
mentally, physically, and emotionally.  Stephanie spoke of one district official who came 
to her after her ordeal and apologized for co-signing on the way she was treated.  This is 
not enough.  I strongly suggest that districts develop programs to address the effects of 
turnaround on principals and their staffs as well as help them transition into new 
positions.  And yes, they should be offered new positions.  Right now they are left to deal 
with the embarrassment and shame of failure alone.  Shunned by their colleagues and 
pitied, they have to navigate the aftermath of school reform and its effects on both their 
physical and mental well-being.  Impersonal treatment like this reveals how districts lose 
good leaders and teachers and has future implications for the recruitment and retention of 
quality educators. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
 My study represents a small sample of principals placed in persistently low-
performing schools who were replaced after they were unsuccessful in raising student test 
scores in a brief period of time.  Notwithstanding, even in this small group, the 
similarities in their stories were remarkable.  Of course, this study could not encompass 
everything relevant to this topic so I offer future topics of research for those who will 
come behind me.  
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The ways in which superintendents select principals for work in turnaround 
schools is one important issue that should be further explored.  Perhaps there are reasons 
that would seem acceptable and rational to put principals with little to no experience in 
failing schools.  Kowal and Ayscue Hassel (2005) suggest that one criteria for choosing a 
principal for a low performing school is the principal should have a track record of some 
kind which would indicate future success.  The authors report the caveat in this selection 
method is that “often, however, a district will be forced to choose among candidates who 
have not lead whole-school turnaround efforts” (p. 26).  Kowal and Ayscue Hassel 
(2005) offer the following guide for district leaders: 
 
When leaders who have a full-scale, school-turnaround track record are not 
available, the district should look for potential leaders who can demonstrate: 
x A track record of leading significant, speedy change where many barriers 
to success existed; changes may be more focused than whole-school 
change but should have involved influencing other people and introducing 
new practices inconsistent with current “policy”; changes should have 
been significant (not just incremental improvements to an existing 
activity). 
x A track record of using some or most of the actions common to 
successful turnarounds . . . 
x Both start-up and managerial success competencies, . . . including the very 
highest level of team leadership needed to implement change, also called 
communicating a compelling vision. 
x A solid understanding of research about effective schools and the ability to 
describe how it applies to children who have not been successful learners 
previously. (p. 26) 
 
Another approach to principal selection that could help lessen the negative impact 
of being replaced would be to offer contracts of no more than three years to principals 
assigned to turnaround low performing schools.  The principals go in to do one job—
improve the school.  When their time is up, they know they will be replaced.  For my 
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participants, this was the hardest part of the process for them.  Having invested so much 
of their personal lives in this work made replacement a devastating event.  Perhaps 
knowing they were only hired to “do a job” would make the experience more palatable.  I 
believe that this method would make the position a more mechanical, results-driven 
experience, rather than one where principals build relationships and nurture connections 
with all stakeholders.  A temporary change agent can go into a school and get results, but 
how does a constant change in leadership shift other dynamics of the school that are not 
measured in test scores?  So while employment contracts could be negotiated in 
alternative ways, it could also contribute to the lack of sustainable growth that is the 
Achilles heel of present school turnaround reform. 
 On the other side of this same coin is the assurance that your career is not derailed 
by one assignment in a high needs school.  I have been a principal for 10 years at the 
same school, which is unheard of in this age of accountability.  In the early years of my 
tenure I was able to lead the school out of school improvement status.  However, the 
erratic nature of public school policy puts schools at risk of suddenly losing their high 
achieving status.  This ebb and flow in education puts you on top one minute and on the 
bottom the next.  Therefore, I do see value in the idea of being “in and out,” as it is highly 
likely that principals will end up “going out” on top, thus dodging the bullet of 
replacement as it is currently practiced. 
Another suggestion for further study is an examination of how districts prepare 
themselves to turn around a school and how the principal and their staff are included in 
this plan.  When districts are placed on “the list” of failing districts in the state, they are 
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required by the state to create plans of improvement.  Once these plans are created, are 
they implemented at the building level and who makes sure this is happening?  From the 
results of my study none of the principals were included in this plan or benefited from its 
design. 
 A very important topic for further research would include the ways in which 
districts handle replacing principals in districts after they have endured these stressful 
conditions in low performing schools.  Some districts managed media fallout while others 
allowed negative coverage to run rampant.  Some principals were given career options 
while others were left to fend for themselves in hopes of being accepted into other 
districts.  Sadly, some were offered no choices at all.  There is a humane way to conduct 
sensitive matters like these within school systems. In this area, districts would be served 
well by following a business model for replacing principals with dignity.  Although we 
are focusing on replacement and not termination of these principals, the work of Lisoski, 
(1998), is relevant to this study.  He posits that “. . . it is critical—no, it’s an obligation—
that the supervisor ensure termination be done with a high degree of professionalism, and 
most importantly, with as high a degree of compassion as possible” (p. 15). 
Most of the districts proved to be oblivious in many respects to such humanity.  
 Although my study was not about the disparities that exist between African-
American, White, male and female principals in low performing schools, with further 
research, I believe that there exists some rich data in my research in regards to how 
women and men differ in their responses to stressful conditions in high risk schools.  I 
also believe that there are issues of gender and race that played a part in how my 
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participants were selected and their career trajectories after being replaced.  The two 
white women, Courtney and Melinda, found new positions as principals either outside 
their districts or within.  The two black scapegoat principals did not.  I believe more 
probing could be done that would reveal some significant findings to add to the literature 
on principal replacement in high needs schools. 
Finally, the experiences of those principals who replace scapegoated principals is 
a subject that is clearly worth investigating.  After hearing the stories of these replaced 
leaders, it would be interesting to compare how districts treat incoming principals after 
they have set up their predecessors for failure.  After Courtney left her school, the new 
principal was celebrated and remained a fixture in the local media each time something 
positive happened at the school.  Courtney spoke very candidly about how the media 
vilified her on several occasions and how the negative portrayals affected her staff.  
Courtney was responsible for the growth that was reported the year after she left, 
however the new principal was the face of the school by then.  This sleight of hand by the 
district deceived the public, confirmed that Courtney was indeed a failure, and made a 
hero out of the new principal.   
Conclusion 
My study was not conducted to defend poor leadership in some of our most needy 
schools.  I am certain there are legitimate reasons for replacing principals who are not 
performing well.  There is poor leadership everywhere and because there is so much at 
stake, I may even be a supporter of true replacement measures that benefit the children in 
our public schools.  My struggle, however, is when principals like those in my study are 
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replaced after only being given a short amount of time to do a great deal of work. If all 
evaluations and performance assessments point to the fact that the principal is not the best 
fit for the school or simply does not have the capacity to lead in any school, they should 
absolutely be replaced.  However, none of my scapegoat principals’ evaluations 
supported their replacement.  Some even won honors for their leadership while some 
spoke of never having been evaluated at all. 
Secondly, if they had strayed from best practices outlined in the research that 
serve as a guide for all of us, I would also conclude that they deserved being moved out 
of their positions.  Were they without personal flaws—certainly not.  I would even say 
each of the participants possessed some personal flaw that could probably become the 
topic of a whole new study about the personal dysfunctions of school leaders.  What we 
all know about leaders, however, is that we often develop coping strategies that allow us 
to continue to perform at high levels in our professions.  The participants even spoke of 
“wearing the mask” at work and staying the course despite what they were experiencing 
personally and emotionally, in order to keep their staff encouraged and productive.  Even 
flawed, they were able to lead significant growth in student performance at their schools.  
Therefore, I submit that the personal flaws they may have possessed were not considered 
career ending because, as I stated earlier in my study, all but one of the participants are 
still working as school administrators.  
But when I review the work of some of the most respected in our field, I saw how 
each of these principals demonstrated distributive leadership, instructional leadership, 
and transformative leadership in their daily operation of the school.  I heard hints of the 
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ethic of care.  I felt the passion for social justice and a focus on culturally responsive 
leadership practices in order to make the school setting more inclusive for all students.  
There was clear evidence that these principals were data driven, collaborative, teachable, 
ethical and professional.  And yet, they were replaced. 
 I was not trying to persuade the reader in any one direction about this 
controversial practice in our public schools.  Their stories are not presented to discredit or 
validate their experiences.  They are simply presented to offer another voice to the 
debate.  What I did set out to do was to make us all pause and think about this movement.  
Is it humane?  Is it fair?  Can we continue to ride this wave of reform at the expense of 
leaders like the ones in my study and allow them to take the fall for all that is wrong in 
our public schools?  More importantly, can our children afford the fallout from the 
upheaval that school turnaround brings as it removes their leaders, teachers, and 
ultimately, the one place where they can depend on stability and structure?  
The argument can always be made that our children cannot afford to have 
ineffective principals for long periods of time when they are already failing.  Change 
must be rapid because this group of students cannot wait any longer.  To this I say, allow 
the principal the same amount of time that the school was allowed to decline prior to their 
arrival.  These principals may only have been able to produce slow, incremental changes.  
However, as Reitzug and Peck (2015b) emphatically state, “benign or outright neglect of 
persistently low performing schools is morally unconscionable” (p. 40).  So then, who 
will speak for these principals?  It is doubtful that anyone could survive under the 
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conditions they faced.  Nevertheless, there are those outliers, those who prove us all 
wrong—or do they? 
I’m reminded of Principal Joe Clark, the celebrated baseball bat-wielding 
administrator in the movie “Lean on Me.”  Based on a true story, Clark is portrayed as 
single-handedly turning around Eastside High School, a low-performing school in inner 
city Paterson, New Jersey.  His unorthodox methods brought him praise and criticism.  
His story is used as a model for no-holds-barred leadership that gets results.  The truth is 
that the dramatic final scene of the movie celebrating the school’s improved test scores 
was actually inflated for the purposes of Hollywood entertainment.  The same month the 
movie was released, Clark is quoted in People Magazine saying,  
 
He concluded that his inability to make his students academically competitive was 
not his problem; it was the system’s. “I see a system,” he says, “that perpetuates 
inferiority in the inner cities.  With inadequate teachers, inadequate supplies, 
inadequate leadership.  I see black and Hispanic youth being exploited.  I see now 
that I’m helpless in raising the educational standards to a reasonable degree at 
Eastside or anywhere in an inner city.  And that tells me, ‘Joe Clark, maybe you 
don’t want to be part of the destructive mechanism.’” (Van Biema & Moses, 
1989, para. 12) 
 
When the Goliaths of school leadership fall, the message spreads throughout the troops 
causing retreat to “safe” schools where they are assured job security, admission of defeat 
and disillusionment with education, or a shortage of those even willing to enlist in the 
fight at all.  There is clear evidence in the literature that school turnaround is not a 
reliable, effective reform strategy.  So then, what makes us blindly anchor our schools to 
unreliable reforms knowing shipwreck is imminent, and the captain and the crew will be 
lost? 
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Although I gained significant insight and “answers” pertaining to each of my 
research questions, answers I did not seek to find were also gifted to me by my 
participant principals—another benefit of using narrative methodology for my study.  I 
was afforded a rare opportunity to hear scapegoated principals’ side of the turnaround 
story.  Although there were some elements I expected to find, the research itself evolved 
into something much more personal for me and the participants that transcended simple 
research questions.  Each of the principals represented more than statistical data used to 
justify deficit rhetoric around failing schools and the leaders who try to change them.   
 As I listened to Samuel’s passionate, angry story of being unjustly replaced, I 
could hear the voices of the struggle of people of color in this country.  Stephanie, who 
eventually could only respond to her pain by sighing, became another “sistah” just trying 
to prove herself as a Black woman in this profession.  When Courtney began crying in 
our interview when she talked about her last day at her school, I saw a wounded mother, 
wife, friend, and finally, leader.  In Melinda’s story, I witnessed a white woman, from a 
privileged past, who recognized her call to the poor, the neglected, and the failing, only to 
have her superiors replace her for not getting the job done to their satisfaction.  Their 
stories became a counter-narrative to the ideas we have become accustomed to and 
accepted as truth whenever we read about another fallen principal.   
Research is often characterized by hours of tediously compiling data and results 
that we are forced to weave into something meaningful.  My work was far from this 
mundane definition and I am grateful for the opportunity to interview some of the 
strongest men and women and I have ever met in the field of education.  I came to see 
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myself as more than a researcher but a guardian of their truth.  Since they had suffered so 
much disrespect at the hands of others, I was mindful that their stories needed to be 
treated with dignity.  Finally, I felt honored that they would trust me with this part of 
their lives, a part that some of them had never spoken of until now.  At the end of my 
interview with Stephanie she said this, 
 
I just want to thank you.  I don’t know how it came to be that you’re doing your 
research on the topic, but I just want to say thank you for listening, thank you for 
giving the voice to us. 
 
This is when I knew that this study was not just an academic work.  It was a good work. 
To these principals I say, 
 
O Captain! My Captain! our fearful trip is done; 
The ship has weather’d every rack, the prize we sought is won; 
The port is near, the bells I hear, the people all exulting, 
While follow eyes the steady keel, the vessel grim and daring: 
 
O Captain! My Captain! rise up and hear the bells; 
Rise up—for you the flag is flung—for you the bugle trills; 
For you bouquets and ribbon’d wreaths—for you the shores a-crowding; 
For you they call, the swaying mass, their eager faces turning; 
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